Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 16 | Number 2

Article 11

2010

Drawing Lines In The Disappearing Sand: A ReEvaluation Of Shoreline Rights And Regimes A
Quarter Century After Bell v. Town Of Wells
Michael P. Dixon
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
Recommended Citation
Michael P. Dixon, Drawing Lines In The Disappearing Sand: A Re-Evaluation Of Shoreline Rights And Regimes A Quarter Century After
Bell v. Town Of Wells, 16 Ocean & Coastal L.J. (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol16/iss2/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

DRAWING LINES IN THE DISAPPEARING SAND: A
RE-EVALUATION OF SHORELINE RIGHTS AND
REGIMES A QUARTER CENTURY AFTER
BELL V. TOWN OF WELLS
Michael P. Dixon*

“The ‘control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance,
born of the Neanderthal age of . . . philosophy, when it was
supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man.”
-Rachel Carson, Silent Spring
INTRODUCTION
Humankind has long tried in vain to exert its will over natural
phenomena that remain beyond its control. There are countless forces of
nature that persistently and consistently foil these attempts, but few are
as bedeviling as those of the sea. While it is now virtually undisputed
that the collective conduct of humankind in recent decades has had a
significant impact on the oceans, only a fool would be so bold as to claim
any sort of dominion over them.
And yet, at the seashore, society’s affinity for drawing lines, building
fences, conveying titles, and generally imposing legal regimes continues
to run up against the prevailing powers of the sea. As a result, countless
legal riddles arise at the water’s edge, where over 50 percent of the
American population now lives,1 where many make their living and
derive their sustenance, and where still more flock for days of frolic.
The attempted solutions to these riddles are as various and numerous as
the issues and, more often than not, courts, legislatures, agencies, and
municipalities at multiple levels throw a combination of doctrines,
* J.D., University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2011.
1. Over Half of the American Population Lives Within 50 Miles of the Coast, NAT’L
OCEAN SERVICE, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/population.html (last updated Apr.
19, 2011) [hereinafter NOAA FACTS].
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statutes, regulations, and ordinances at any given dispute.2 But the seas,
storms, and sands have yet to yield to even these weighty efforts to
impose order.3
Over twenty years ago, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (locally
known as the Law Court) disregarded the realities recognized in the
overwhelming majority of states and reasserted one of the more
antiquated legal rationales on the books to circumscribe a starkly limited
public trust in the foreshore. In so holding, the Law Court also struck
down the state legislature’s declaration of a more expansive public trust
and granted preeminence to the claims of private beachfront landowners.4
In the years following what are now commonly known as the Moody
Beach Cases,5 commentators upset by both the outcome and the
reasoning, which was largely grounded in a colonial ordinance over 300
2. In addition to the many rules of common law, legislative bodies at both the
federal and state levels have enacted countless statutes and created innumerable
administrative bodies to address issues at or near the shoreline. See, e.g., Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (2006); the Public Trust in Intertidal Land
Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2011). Examples of parallel
administrative bodies include the NOAA Office of Coastal Resource Management and
the Maine Coastal Program. And more than one state has included coastal provisions in
its Constitution. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Many of
these authorities and agencies have overlapping and often contradictory scope and
enforcement powers, and so must be reconciled with one another, not to mention with the
ancient common law doctrines. For example, at the state level alone in Maine, there are
at least nine state statutes that impact the shoreline zone. MARINE LAW INST., MAINE
STATE P LANNING OFFICE & MAINE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ANTICIPATORY PLANNING FOR
SEA LEVEL RISE ALONG THE COAST OF MAINE A-1 (1994), available at
http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/downloads/maine_a.pdf
[hereinafter
MAINE
ANTICIPATORY PLANNING] (identifying the state’s Natural Resource Protection Act and
Sand Dunes Regulations; the Coastal Management Policies Act; the Growth Management
Act; the Shoreland Zoning Act; the Site Location of Development Act; the Subdivision
Law; the State Floodplain Management Program; the Submerged Lands Act; and the
Coastal Barrier Resources System).
3. “To know the beaches is to know the beaches are moving.” WALLACE KAUFMAN
& ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING: THE DROWNING OF AMERICA’S
SHORELINE 13 (1983). “We ignore this when we build motels, pavilions, boardwalks, and
even whole towns on the edge of the ocean. In our business hats we do not recognize any
real estate as movable. Corners are staked, lines drawn, and neat rectangular lots are
recorded in courthouses as if they would be true forever.” Id. “Beaches are not stable,
but they are in dynamic equilibrium.” Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted)
4. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 178-179 (Me. 1989).
5. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Bell II, 557 A.2d 168.
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years old, have flooded the pages of this journal and others with critique.
Just over ten years ago, in Eaton v. Town of Wells,6 a case that bore both
geographical and legal resemblance to the questions presented in the
Moody Beach Cases, Justice Saufley, now the Chief Justice of the Law
Court, called for their overturn.7 Thus far, however, none of these
arguments has crested the judicial seawall, and the legislature has not
returned directly to such turbulent waters since.
Meanwhile, those two decades have also brought substantial changes
in both the seascape and the legal landscape that call for yet another
reassessment of how best to confront those issues that arise along with
tides, wind, waves, and storm surge. Part I of this Comment will explore
the history and development of both civil and common law frameworks
of rights and privileges at the coastline. In Part II, this Comment will
outline the situation that gave rise to the controversial decision of the
Law Court, the arguments of the majority of the court, the ensuing
dissent and critique, and an independent analysis. With this foundation
laid, the third and fourth parts of this Comment will examine recent
trends and developments that call for a more effective approach to the
shoreline realities unacknowledged by the majority of the Law Court in
1989. In Part III, this Comment will explore four recent case studies in
which these legal frameworks were applied very differently in other
American jurisdictions than in Maine. Part IV will document the
increasing challenges of climate change and the futility of coastal
engineering. Finally, this Comment will synthesize the implications of
these factors and propose that these previously unknown or overlooked
scientific, theoretical, and legal grounds call more loudly than ever for a
more sustainable legal approach at the sea’s dynamic edge.
I. DOCTRINES AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
A. Overview
For better or worse, with some apparent success and some obvious
failure, humankind has long tried to exert control over the environment.
More often than not, at least in the Western canon, man is pitted against
the forces of nature, and nature against man. Having largely secured
basic shelter and a steady supply of food, Western society has moved on
to devote tremendous manpower and financial resources to tame the

6. 760 A.2d 232 (Me. 2000).
7. Id. at 248 (Saufley, J., concurring).
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courses of rivers,8 seed the clouds for rain, drill into the ocean floor,9 and
corral mudslides, rockslides, and lava flows—to cite just a few
examples.10 But society may spend at least as much time engineering
legal constructs as it does rigs, dams, and arroyos.
Whether in court, on the floor of the legislature, or in our everyday
speech, our language and our legal fictions frequently reflect this
perception of rights to possession and control in the face of natural
phenomena. Instead of describing our responsibilities in relationship
with, or stewardship of, nature, we talk about our rights as owners of
land, of water, of the air, of an unimpeded view of the sun.11 Delineating
these property “rights,” even in the most tangible of these, land, has
proven no easy task. We have had to create doctrines of title and real
property interests. We name and define fees as simple and absolute
when they are more truly neither. We separate property interests into
strands, or sticks, in a bundle—access, use, usufruct, exclusion—each a
cognizable piece of property, theoretically capable of being allocated by
gift or sale, or of being taken by the government. In so doing, we create
legal fictions of permanency in a world that reminds us every day of how
impermanent our existence is.

8. On April 29, 2011, a federal judge approved the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers’
plan to blast a two-mile wide hole into its own levee on the Mississippi River. Gerry
Smith, In Illinois, Flooding Leads to Border Tension, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2011,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-illinois-flooding20110430,0,1959238.story. Three days later, the Birds Point levee was blown open,
inundating 130,000 acres of Missouri farmland and 90 homes in hopes of preventing
flooding in Cairo, Illinois. A.G. Sulzberger, River Level Drops After Blast at Levee, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
3,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/us/04levee.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&sq=River
Level Drops after blast&st=cse&scp=1.
9. On April 20, 2011, when the risks of drilling deep into the sea floor from a
floating offshore rig were underestimated, an explosion destroyed the platform, killed
eleven people, and released over four million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. BOB
GRAHAM & WILLIAM REILLY, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING vi (2011).
10. See, e.g., JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 190 (1989). One of the more
extreme examples of this urge can be found in recently proposed responses to global
warming, including a geoengineering technique known as ocean iron fertilization, which
seeks to promote algae growth in the ocean in order to increase global carbon absorption.
See, e.g., Ken Buesseler et al., Ocean Iron Fertilization—Moving Forward in a Sea of
Uncertainty, 319 SCI. 161 (2008).
11. Cf. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 16 (1826)
(translating THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1.).
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Nowhere, perhaps, are these conflicts more apparent than at the
ocean’s edge, where several common law doctrines, the most prominent
of which are surveyed here, have attempted to describe rights in the
midst of ever-shifting topographies.
B. Selected “Traditional” Doctrines
1. Shoreline Variations: Avulsion, Accretion, Erosion, and Reliction
The urge to impose rules even upon the shifting sands is an ancient
and universal one. As the Michigan Supreme Court has observed, “All
maritime nations, recognizing the vagaries of the sea . . . have evolved
systems of law, founded upon . . . conceptions of common justice, to
adjust and compensate its effects.”12
As may already be apparent, the description of shoreline movements
has required the creation of a specialized and specified vocabulary. For
example, “erosion” is the gradual and imperceptible13 wearing away of
land from the shore or bank. “Accretion” means the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of land along the shore or bank of a body of
water.14 “Reliction” is an increase of the land by a gradual and
imperceptible withdrawal of any body of water.15 “Avulsion” on the
other hand, is the sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the
action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course
of a stream.16
According to one general, longstanding, and widely accepted rule,
where a large body of water works gradually or imperceptibly to change
the shoreline by deposits or erosion, the title of the riparian owner
follows the shoreline “under what has been graphically called ‘a movable

12. Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 165 (Mich. 1930).
13. “Gradual and imperceptible” means that, although witnesses may periodically
perceive changes in the waterfront, they could not observe them occurring. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 582 (8th ed. 2004); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 101 (2000); see
generally FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA
EXPERIENCE 385-92 (1968).
14. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 22; C.J.S., supra note 13, § 94;
see generally MALONEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 685-92.
15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1317; C.J.S., supra note 13, §
94; see generally MALONEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 685-92.
16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 147; C.J.S., supra note 13, § 94;
see generally MALONEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 685-92. “Alluvion” describes the actual
deposit of land that is added to the shore or bank. 78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters § 315 (2002).
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freehold.’”17 On the other hand, the equally widespread law is that the
rapid addition or loss of land due to avulsion (that is, by a sudden natural
phenomenon) does not affect the seaward boundary of the upland
owner.18 Thus, under the common law of most states, “the legal effect of
changes to the shoreline on the boundary between public lands and
uplands varies depending upon whether the shoreline changes gradually
and imperceptibly or whether it changes suddenly and perceptibly.”19
In the end, then, “the principal significance of the distinction
between erosion[, reliction], and accretion on the one hand, and avulsion
on the other,” according to Blackstone’s age-old summary,
is that the owner of the [upland] loses title to land that is lost by
erosion and ordinarily becomes the owner of land that is added
to his land by accretion [or reliction], whereas if an avulsion has
occurred, the boundary line remains the same regardless of the
change in the . . . shoreline.20
There are four commonly cited rationales underlying these doctrines
that attempt to balance the interests of the parties affected by inevitable
changes in the shoreline:
(1) [D]e minimis non curat lex; (2) he who sustains the burden
of losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity of waters
ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion;
(3) it is in the interest of the community that all land have an
owner and, for convenience, the riparian is the chosen one; (4)
the necessity for preserving the riparian right of access to the
water.21
Despite all these doctrinal distinctions and variations, the boundary
in the vast majority of states between public lands and private uplands
remains the mean high water line (MHWL), which represents an average

17. Id. at 165-166 (quoting Hallsbury, 28 Laws of England 361); see also COASTAL
STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 108 (David C. Slade,
R. Kerry Kehoe, Jane K. Stahl eds., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter COASTAL STATES ORG.].
18. Id.
19. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (STBR I), 998 So. 2d 1102,
1113 (Fla. 2008).
20. STBR I, 998 So. 2d. at 1114 (citing 73 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 167, 182); see
also 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03(b)(2) (2007); 78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters § 315
(2002).
21. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee,
Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. App. Ct. 1973); see also MALONEY ET AL., supra note
13, at 685-92.
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over a nineteen-year period.22 Thus, in cases of erosion, reliction, and
accretion, the boundary between public and private land is a flexible
MHWL, “altered to reflect gradual and imperceptible losses or additions
to the shoreline.”23 Under the doctrine of avulsion, however, the MHWL
does not move, and “the boundary between public and private land
remains the MHWL as it existed before the avulsive event led to sudden
and perceptible losses or additions to the shoreline.”24
2. The Common Enemy Doctrine
Even with all these doctrines in place, the determination of what is a
natural or artificial change in the shoreline due to accretion can be
perplexing. This is particularly true because “[n]early every area of
public trust shoreline in the country has been modified to some degree,
by groins, jetties, dams, seawalls, wharfs, piers, docks, hydraulic mining,
beach nourishment, dredging and other actions.”25 Responding to this
prevalence of engineered shoreline structures, courts of the past have
also devised a “common enemy doctrine,” so called because it
recognizes a an upland owner’s right to defend and armor his property
against the erosive forces of the sea—the common enemy in question—
even to the detriment of his neighbor’s property.26
22. See, e.g., George M. Cole, Tidal Water Boundaries, 20 STETSON L. REV. 165, 16667 (1990). This figure is rounded off from the 18.6 years it takes for the variations which
occur in major tide producing forces to go through one complete cycle. Frank E.
Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water
Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 196 (1974). In some states,
this nineteen-year period for determining the MHWL is codified. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §
177.27 (14-15) (2007). As to the boundary line, only Maine and four other states, all
founding colonies (Massachusetts, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia), recognize
private ownership rights all the way down to the low-water line, while Texas and Hawai’i
recognize public rights all the way up to the natural vegetation line. See Robin Kundis
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of
States, Property Rights, and State Summaries (2007), available at
http://works.bepress.com/robin_craig/1; see also infra note 51. Under Roman civil law,
the upper boundary of the public’s seashore went “as far as the greatest wave extended
itself in the winter.” ANGELL, supra note 11, at 65. Though no state’s public trust reaches
this far today, the closest are in Texas and Hawai’i, where public easements are
recognized up to the natural vegetation line. See infra notes 183 (applicable Hawai’ian
case law), 202 (applicable Texas statute).
23. STBR I, 998 So. 2d. at 1114.
24. Id.; see also, e.g., Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 838-39 (Fla. 1970).
25. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 110.
26. Under the common enemy doctrine:
[a] man may raise an embankment on his own property to prevent the
encroachments of the sea, although the fact of his doing so may be to cause the
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3. The Equal-Footing Doctrine
Of great, if well camouflaged, significance in the coastal issues that
arise, the equal-footing doctrine “creates a strong presumption,” based on
agreements made to entice states and territories to join the union, “that
newly admitted states acquire [without encumbrance of any kind] title to
lands under navigable waters upon their admission to statehood.”27 The
equal-footing doctrine has also played an important role in the
revitalization of the public trust doctrine.
4. The Public Trust Doctrine
a. Ancient Roots
The public trust doctrine, which holds that some things, by their
nature, are common to all, is rooted in an ancient Roman precept of
natural law. This precept is most famously captured by the Institutes of
Justinian:
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea;
no man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the
seashore, whilst he abstains from damaging farms, monuments,
edifices, etc. which are not in common as the sea is.28
water to beat with violence against the adjoining lands, thereby rendering it
necessary for the adjoining landowner to enlarge or strengthen his defenses.
U.S. v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Revell v. People, 52 N.E.
1052, 1059 (Ill. 1898)). This same adversarial approach to natural phenomena is
manifest in both everyday parlance and in judicial contexts, where reference is made to
windborne and waveborne natural disasters that wreak havoc and devastation and cause
losses of land and damages to the landscape that we need to repair. See, e.g., DAVID M.
BUSH, ORRIN H. PILKEY JR. & WILLIAM J. NEAL, LIVING BY THE RULES OF THE SEA 1
(1996) [hereinafter RULES OF THE SEA] (reporting that Hurricane Hazel (1954) “raked the
coast of the Carolinas” and “left a path of over $280 million in destruction”; Hurricane
Betsy (1965) became the first hurricane to exceed $1 billion in damages; Hurricane
Camille (1969) killed 256 along the Gulf coast and caused $1.4 billion in property loss;
Hurricane Frederic (1979) “ran up a $2.3 billion bill in losses”; and Hurricane Hugo
(1989) “left a wake of widespread destruction” along the coast).
27. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1183.
28. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 181 n.2 (Me. 1989) (Wathen, J.,
dissenting) (quoting JUSTINIAN INST. 2.1.1) (emphasis added). Expressed with a slight
variation, under Roman civil law, which was codified under Justinian between 529 and
534 A.D., waters and shores were considered res nullius, incapable of being owned. See
COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 4; ANGELL, supra note 11, at 17. The original
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The sixth century Institutes of Justinian were in turn based on the earlier
second century Institutes and Journal of Gaius, another eminent Roman
jurist, who had codified the even older natural law of Greek
philosophers.29 Still another earlier classical jurist, Julian, found further
justification for the public trust in the longstanding use of custom.30 To
the extent, therefore, that they were not only “ancient in their own right,”
but also rooted in even more ancient soil and time-tested by centuries of
custom, “the Institutes of Justinian remain the touchstone of today’s
Public Trust Doctrine.”31
After ignoring these principles during the Middle Ages, English
common law grew to recognize similar public, or sovereign, rights in all
“those things which from their nature cannot be exclusively occupied and
enjoyed,” including tidewaters and the lands beneath.32 Lord Chief
Justice Hale, a noted jurist of the seventeenth century, observed that,
though some private interest in the tidelands was possible, title to the
intertidal zone remained presumptively with the sovereign.33 Indeed, in
adopting the doctrine, English common law also strengthened it,
imposing on the government “an affirmative duty to administer, protect,
manage and conserve fish and wildlife.”34

code acknowledged that the seashore was “subject to the same law as the sea itself, and
the sand or ground beneath it,” and could not be considered private property. Thomas
Hodgins, Ancient Law of Nations Respecting the Sea and Sea-shore, 13 CANADIAN L.
TIMES 16 (1893) (quoting JUSTINIAN INST. 2.1.5).
29. COASTAL STATES ORG, supra note 17, at 4.
30. “Immemorial custom is properly preserved as law and this is the law that is said to
have been enacted by usage. For since statutes bind us for no other reason than that they
have been received by the opinion of the people, properly also those things which the
people have approved without any writing at all will bind all; for what does it matter
whether the people declares its will by vote or by circumstances and conduct? Wherefore
even this principle is most rightly received that statutes are abrogated not only by vote of
the legislator but also by the tacit consent of all through desuetude.” JOHN P. DAWSON,
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 128 (1968) (quoting Dig. 1.3.32 (Julianus, Dig. 94)); see also
Robert George, Comment, The “Public Access Doctrine:” Our Constitutional Right to
Sun, Surf, and Sand, 11 Ocean & Coastal L. J. 73, 73 (2006).
31. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 4.
32. ANGELL, supra note 11, at 17.
33. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 181 (quoting HALE, DE JURE MARIS (ch. 4) (“The shore is that
ground that is between the ordinary high-water mark and low-water mark. This doth
prima facie and of common right belong to the king . . . . [S]uch shore may and
commonly is parcel of the manor adjacent, and so may be belonging to a subject . . . yet
prima facie it is the king’s”), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE
LAW OF ENGLAND FROM MANUSCRIPTS 12-13 (F. Hargrave 1st ed. 1787).
34. George, supra note 30, at 76.
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English common law, of course, went on to become the law of the
thirteen colonies, and then of the states.35 Accordingly, each of these
held, and continues to hold, a public trust interest in its tidelands up to
the ordinary high water mark.36 That said, “[e]ach also had, and
continues to have, the authority to define the boundaries of the lands held
in public trust as well as the authority to recognize private rights in its
trust lands, and thus diminish the public’s rights therein as they see fit.”37
b. Defining the American Public Trust Lands
In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that each state had a
duty to protect lands in the public trust, and that this obligation to
preserve access under the public trust doctrine is inalienable.38 Among
the common attributes of most public trust lands is the fact that “they are
generally unsuitable for commercial agriculture or permanent
structures.”39 And, “[b]ecause of the ‘public’ nature of trust lands, the
title to them is not a singular title in the manner of most other real estate
titles.”40 Instead, public trust land is viewed as being “vested with two
titles: the jus publicum, the public’s right to use and enjoy trust lands and
waters for commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and other related
public purposes, and the jus privatum, or the private proprietary rights in
the use and possession of trust lands.”41 In other words, while in many
ways the jus publicum title may be considered something less than fee
simple ownership, it also cannot be sold.42
At the same time, in another 1892 case, the Supreme Court signaled
that it would not impose a single nationwide public trust doctrine,
leaving each state to apply the public trust doctrine to lands and waters
“within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy.”43
As a result, “there are over fifty different applications of the [public

35. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 13.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
38. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892).
39. COASTAL STATES, supra note 17, at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42.The sovereign may dispose of its proprietary rights in trust lands, the jus privatum,
but its obligation to manage trust lands in the public interest, the jus publicum, is
inalienable. A private lessee or owner may have possession and the benefits of certain
rights, but his interest is subject at all times to superior public interests.
RICHARD HILDRETH & RALPH W. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 80 (1983).
43. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
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trust] doctrine, one for each State, Territory, or Commonwealth, as well
as the federal government.”44
In his landmark article at the vanguard of the twentieth-century
renewal of the public trust doctrine, Professor Joseph Sax observed that
courts would “look with considerable skepticism” upon any government
action that restricted public rights to use and access any resource held by
the state.45 Before long, “nearly every State ha[d] modified the English
common law, either by Constitution or legislatively,” to curtail riparian
rights for private owners and expand them for public access and use.46
California and New Jersey described a broad, flexible doctrine of public
trust, which adapts with changing times, and most other states followed
suit.47 Even the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took approving note:
More recently, courts and commentators have found in the
doctrine a dynamic common-law principle flexible enough to
meet diverse modern needs. The doctrine has been expanded to
protect additional water-related uses such as swimming and
similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and
preservation of flora and fauna indigenous to public trust lands.
It has evolved from a primarily negative restraint on states’
ability to alienate trust lands into a source of positive state
duties.48
In 1988, the Supreme Court again stepped into the process of
defining the public trust by declaring that each state, “upon entry into the
Union, received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide.”49 According to the Court, “the States have interests
in lands beneath tidal waters which have nothing to do with navigation,”

44. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 3.
45. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970).
46. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 292.
47. George, supra note 30, at 78-79; Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471
A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (“The public’s right to use the tidal lands and water
encompasses navigation, fishing, and recreational uses, including bathing, swimming,
and other shore activities.”); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea,
294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) (“The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles,
should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”); State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (public has access and enjoyment rights
to all lands seaward of the vegetation line).
48. D.C. v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
49. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).
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such as “bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral
development.”50
Maine, however, would prove resistant to this nearly universal
recognition of extensive public trust rights in the tidelands.51
II. THE MOODY BEACH CASES
A. Factual Background
Beginning in 1984 with a quiet title action that was anything but
quiet, Moody Beach, a mile-long strand situated at the southern edge of
the Town of Wells, Maine, became the focus of a heated and complicated
legal debate that would last for years.52 At issue were the conflicting
private and public claims to ownership and use rights in the wide wetsand, intertidal portion of Moody Beach.53
50. Id. at 476, 482.
51. All but five states would go on to recognize extensive public rights in the
foreshore; only Maine and four other states, all of them among the thirteen original
colonies and all of them endowed with statehood by 1790, insisted on adhering to prestatehood, colonial policies by limiting public access and use in the tidelands. See Craig,
supra note 22.
52. MARINE LAW INST., CITIZENS’ GUIDES TO OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: PUBLIC
SHORELINE ACCESS AND THE MOODY BEACH CASE 1 (1990) [hereinafter MLI GUIDE
1990].
Moody Beach is a sandy beach located within the Town of Wells. It is about a mile
long and lies between Moody Point on the north, the Ogunquit town line on the
south, the Atlantic Ocean on the east, and a seawall on the west. Moody Beach
has a wide intertidal zone with a strip of dry sand above the mean high water mark.
More than one hundred privately owned lots front on the ocean at Moody Beach.
In addition, the Town of Wells in the past has acquired by eminent domain three
lots which it uses for public access to the ocean . . . Each lot is about 50 feet wide
and is bordered on the west by Ocean Avenue . . . A public beach, now known as
Ogunquit Beach, lies immediately to the south of Moody Beach; the Village of
Ogunquit acquired that beach by eminent domain in 1925.
Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 170 (Me. 1989).
53. Intertidal land means “all land . . . affected by the tides between the mean high
watermark and either 100 rods seaward from the high watermark or the mean low
watermark, whichever is closer to the mean high watermark.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 572 (2011). That definition derives directly from the Colonial Ordinance of 164147. See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509, 512 (Me. 1986). “At times the
alternative terms ‘flats,’ ‘foreshore,’ and ‘beachfront’ are used.” Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169
n.3. The lots in question, plus another two miles of beachfront property, were reportedly
purchased from the state in 1888 by a Portsmouth lawyer, who then resold them
separately to private owners in the ensuing years, notwithstanding a mile-long stretch that
he sold to the Town of Ogunquit. Beach Ownership Splits Maine Town, N.Y. TIMES, July
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In 1984, 28 of the over 100 homeowners whose homes abutted the
beach, including the named plaintiff Edward Bell, sought a judicial
declaration and injunction limiting the public’s use of the beach.54
Expressing concerns over a perceived increase in public use of the beach
and reluctance on the part of town officials to enforce against
“trespassers,” the homeowners sought a court order “to prevent the
public from walking, swimming, sunbathing, or using the beach in front
of their homes for general recreational purposes.” 55
According to Mr. Bell, who owned one of the houses on the beach
for forty years, the town had put up signs directing the public to the
beach and provided a public lifeguard on it.56 “People would come down
through our property and sit on our steps and tie their dogs to our railing
[or] start a baseball game, and these weren’t necessarily nice people.”57
But one local resident, who had been celebrating the Fourth of July with
her family on that beach for twenty-five years, summed up the feelings
of many others: “It’s a crime that a handful of people can close public
access to the ocean [on] the nicest stretch of sandy beach in Maine.”58
The Wells town manager at the time countered, “people here have
always used that beach,” and explained that part of the problem lies in
the fact that, when the contiguous public beach in Ogunquit becomes
crowded, people simply wander quite naturally over to Moody Beach,
which, though technically a different beach in a different town, is
visually inseparable.59 When initially presented with the question, the
superior court validated the state’s claims of sovereign immunity and
dismissed the case.60
B. The Decisions
On appeal, however, the Law Court held that no sovereign immunity
applied and vacated the judgment, sending the case back to the superior
court with an explicitly indicated presumption for private ownership of

11,
1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/11/us/beach-ownership-splits-mainetown.html?pagewanted=1.
54. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169.
55. MLI GUIDE 1990, supra note 52, at 1.
56. Beach Ownership Splits Maine Town, supra note 53.
57. Id. The author knows of no assertion, and makes none here, of any public right to
make use of the lot owners’ steps or railings.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509, 510 (Me. 1986).
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the tidelands.61 The court grounded its reasoning in a document
predating Maine statehood by nearly two centuries, the Colonial
Ordinance of 1641-1647, which provided for a public easement in the
tidelands for fishing, fowling, and navigation.62 This decision came
down May 23, 1986.63 In the interim, though, the state legislature had
enacted the Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act (PTILA), which was to
take effect July 16, 1986.64 Nevertheless, after a four-week bench trial,
the superior court entered judgments in the fall of 1987 in favor of the
private landowners, declaring the PTILA unconstitutional and finding no
public rights in Moody Beach beyond those afforded in the Colonial
Ordinance of 1641-1647.65
Upon subsequent review, the Law Court held that “the plaintiff
oceanfront owners at Moody Beach hold title in fee to the intertidal land
subject to an easement, to be broadly construed, permitting public use
only for fishing, fowling, and navigation . . . and any other uses
reasonably incidental or related thereto.”66 Acknowledging expanding
public recreation needs,67 the court nonetheless further concluded that,
because it “declare[d] an unlimited right in the public to use the intertidal
land for ‘recreation,’” PTILA was unconstitutional.68 “The courts and
the legislature cannot simply alter . . . long-established property rights to
accommodate new recreational needs; constitutional prohibitions on the
taking of private property without compensation must be considered.”69
61. Id.
62. Id. at 512-13.
63. Id at 509.
64. Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 571-573
(2011); see also Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169 n.4; 1985 Me. Laws 782.
65. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 510.
66. Id. at 169.
67. Curiously, the Law Court took the time to note the superior court’s findings that
strolling up and down the beach had indeed been established as an open and continuous
public use and that the plaintiffs were “perfectly willing to permit this.” Bell II, 557 A.2d
at 170; but see id. at 192 (Wathen, J., dissenting) (“Twice in its opinion this Court
mentions the finding of the Superior Court concerning the public’s habit of ‘strolling’ up
and down the length of Moody Beach and the acquiescence of the private owners.
Despite the shoreowners’ testimony that they would continue to permit this activity in the
future, they are not bound to do so, and the Superior Court order, affirmed by this Court,
does not acknowledge any right on the part of the public to stroll on the beach. This
Court’s opinion does nothing to dispel the obvious conclusion that from this moment on,
at Moody Beach and every other private shore in Maine, the public’s right even to stroll
upon the intertidal lands hangs by the slender thread of the shoreowners’ consent.”) .
68. Id.
69. Id.; but see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034-1035
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that states “should not be prevented from
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Those “long-established property rights,” in the view of a 4-3
majority of the Law Court, flowed from the Colonial Ordinance and
subsequent local usage and practice that were made law in the new state
of Maine “by force of article X, section 3 of the Maine Constitution.”70
According to the Law Court, the PTILA imposed upon all intertidal land
(defined by the Act in accordance with the Colonial Ordinance) an
easement for “recreation” that was “unqualified,” “undefined,” and
“unlimited.”71 Reasoning that this sort of recreation “without limitation”
amounted to “much greater rights” for the public in the intertidal zone,
the court concluded that, because it did not provide for compensation, the
Act thus amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private property.72
The interference with private property here, the Law Court
concluded, amounted to a “wholesale denial” of an owner’s right to
exclude the public.73 “If a possessory interest in real property has any
meaning at all,” the court reasoned, “it must include the general right to
exclude others.”74 Finally, the court analogized its holding to a
contemporary decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which found an
unconstitutional taking, however slight the adverse economic impact on
the owners, when California had conditioned a seaside building permit
upon the private owners’ “mak[ing] an easement across their beachfront
available to the public on a permanent basis.”75
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions [because the]
Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law.”).
70. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 171; ME. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“All laws now in force in this
State, and not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain, and be in force, until altered or
repealed by the Legislature, or shall expire by their own limitation.”).
71. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177. Compare id. at 176-177 with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
§§ 571-573 (2011). The majority refers to the “sole exceptions” laid out by the statute,
when there are in fact four. Limitations include non-interference with existing structures,
no use of motorized vehicles or watercraft without explicit authorization, and a provision
that the municipality may exercise its authority to further limit permitted uses. See id. §
573(2)(B), (D), and (3).
72. The Law Court follows this conclusion with the requisite “parade of horribles” of
all the objectionable activities the statute would permit, including baseball games and
extended camping, none of which would actually be possible for more than a couple
hours in the intertidal zone, which is, by definition, covered by water much of the day.
Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177.
73. Id. at 178 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (Mass. 1974)).
74. Id. at 177 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974)).
75. Id. at 178; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832
(1987) (“We think a ‘permanent physical occupation’ has occurred, for purposes of that
rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so
that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual
is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.”).
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C. Dissent
The dissent protested that the public rights had existed at common
law and predated the Ordinance and the custom of private ownership.76
It noted that the “grant of land” to the lower water mark by the
Ordinance had been designed only for the times to promote commerce by
encouraging the construction of wharves at private expense.77 “The
common law,” it exhorted, “would ill deserve its familiar panegyric as
the ‘perfection of human reason’ if it did not expand with the progress of
society and develop with new ideas of right and justice.”78 It also
pointed out the court’s error in not affording the legislative enactment of
the PTILA a presumption of constitutionality.79 Finally, the dissent
highlighted the paradoxical scenarios under the majority’s interpretation
that would allow, for example, a picnic in a rowboat on the foreshore but
prohibit a picnic on a blanket, or that would allow a man to stand kneedeep in the water so long as he was looking for a lobster or crab, but not
if he was “bathing.”80 Each of these arguments pierced a hole in the
bulwark of the majority opinion, exposing a number of weaknesses that
have been further probed in critiques and concurrences in the ensuing
years.
D. A Closer Look
Taking its initial cue from the dissenting opinion, this Section will
attempt to elaborate on some of the flaws in the underpinnings of the
majority opinion—an unfortunate choice of law, an unsound theory, a
mistaken statutory interpretation, an abrupt takings analysis, and
compromising facts—that call its continuing legitimacy into question on
legal and logical grounds alone.
1. Choices of Law
First, the court’s reliance on the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647, to
which it attributed its narrow construction of the public trust doctrine,
was misplaced on multiple counts. At the outset, the court chose to
adhere to a literal reading of the ordinance and a selected reading of only
76. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 183-184 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 185.
78. Id. at 189 (quoting In re Robinson, 33 A. 652, 654 (1895)).
79. Id. at 192.
80. Id. at 189 (citing Jeffrey D. Curtis, Coastal Recreation: Legal Methods for
Securing Public Rights in the Seashore, 33 ME. L. REV. 69, 83 (1981)).
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those Massachusetts cases that did the same to conclude that the drafters
of the ordinance retained a public easement to the intertidal zone solely
for the purposes of “fishing, fowling and navigation.”81
Despite its claim to the contrary, the Bell II court could have taken a
more flexible and equitable approach to interpreting the statute and the
case law—one essential, as the dissent points out, to the very character of
the evolving common law. Such an approach was sanctioned by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby82 and applied in the vast majority of
states. Claiming a lack of precedent on point, the court referred only to
two Massachusetts cases, when, in fact, it could have easily and properly
taken into consideration a whole host of public trust doctrine cases from
coast to coast, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court. The Massachusetts
cases, moreover, were not nearly as unanimous as the Bell II majority
portrayed them. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had
previously declared in 1863 that “It would scarcely be necessary to
mention bathing, or the use of the water for washing, or watering cattle,
preparation of flax, or other agricultural uses, to all which uses a large
body of water, devoted to public enjoyment, would usually be applied.”83
And that court had also held that “it would be too strict a doctrine” to
limit the public trust in the tidelands to navigation alone, reasoning that
the public trust “is wider in its scope, and it includes all necessary and
proper uses, in the interest of the public.”84
What’s more, though, the Bell II majority apparently also failed to
consider the rationale underlying the colonial ordinance of 1641-1647.
As even the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recognized, the
notion of “extending private titles to encompass land as far as mean low
water line” was “an extraordinary step” taken by “colonial authorities”
in order to promote the building of more wharves in a region of wide,
gradually sloped beaches and flats.85 There simply is no longer any need
to encourage the building of wharves, nor has there been one for at least
decades. Indeed, today the state is more likely to deny a permit for the
81. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509, 514-15 (Me. 1986); Bell II, 557
A.2d at 169.
82. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). The U.S. Supreme Court has also
recognized that it is within a state’s discretion to grant riparian rights to persons “whether
owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it [is] considered for the best interests of the
public.” Id. at 26.
83. Inhabitants of W. Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. 158, 167 (1863).
84. Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909).
85. Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Mass.
1974) (citing Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810)) (emphasis added); see also George,
supra note 30, at 79-80.
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building of any wharf at Moody Beach.86 Without this underlying
rationale, the provisions of the colonial ordinance lose their purpose and
meaning. There is, therefore, a galling quality to the court’s assertion
that public and private rights in the foreshore today must conform to the
decisions taken under exceptional circumstances by ancestors 350 years
ago who undoubtedly had different conceptions of usual and unusual87
and who were seeking to promote the building of structures society now
restricts. As property theorist Laura Underkuffler has observed, “All
individual and public claims [to property] are subject to dispute, discard,
evolution, and change, as societally constructed understandings.”88
2. Inapplicable Theories
General theories of private property rights are similarly unavailing
when it comes to the tidelands. As with ordinances that lose their
validity when their underlying economic development motives vanish,
so, too, “private property is a form of state-sanctioned power [and] it is
legitimate and worthy of respect only when it is adequately justified.”89
And at least one commentator has shown in the pages of this journal that
a policy of private ownership, even of the dry sand area of the shoreline,
(much less the wet sand area) fails on theoretical grounds.90
For example, John Locke’s labor theory of property, which was
widely known in colonial America, asserted that “the right to own land . .
. derives from working or ‘improving’ the land.”91 “As much Land as a
Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so
much is his Property. He by his Labour does, as it were, inclose from
the Common.”92 But this theory simply cannot apply to a foreshore that
86. See, e.g., Uliano v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 977 A.2d 400, 403, 408 (Me. 2009)
(upholding the denial of a dock permit under a statute barring structure that would
“unreasonably interfere with existing scenic, aesthetic, recreational, or navigational uses”
(quoting 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(1) (2008))).
87. Notably, in 1641, Massachusetts also became the first colony to statutorily
recognize slavery. See THE MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, § 91 (1641), available
at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/masslib.html.
88. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 93
(2003).
89. Id. at 49 (quoting ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON GOOD 107 (2003)).
90. See generally Robert Thompson, Property Theory and Owning the Sandy Shore:
No Firm Ground to Stand On, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 47 (2005-2006).
91. Id. at 54.
92. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689) reprinted in
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 17 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978)).
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can be neither worked not improved, land that cannot be tilled, planted,
improved, or cultivated.
Alternatively, the aggregate social utility theory, arguably the
dominant moral justification for private property ownership in the United
States, proposes a somewhat different rationale: “Private property exists
and is legitimate because of the overall utility it generates for society as a
whole. With reasonably secure rights, a person can plant in the spring
confident that she can harvest in the fall.”93 Again, though, of what use
is it to either the individual or the public to guarantee the fall harvest of a
seed planted in spring where no seeds can be planted? Of what use is the
guarantee of investment backed expectations where none can logically or
legally be held?
Thus, neither Locke’s labor theory nor the aggregate social utility
theory, articulates any benefit that might lie in the private ownership of
property of such a unique and inherently impermanent nature as
tidelands. As Thompson and others conclude, we have seen that the very
nature of almost all public trust lands, is that they are unsuitable for
possession and commercial or agricultural development; this is
unquestionably true of beaches, and particularly of wet sand beaches.94
Regardless of whether there can be legitimate private ownership
rights in the tidelands, though, the Bell II court goes on to ground its
decision in a fundamental right to exclude others, which seems to be
based at least in part on concepts of privacy and nuisance theory. The
circumstances of Moody Beach,95 however, do not lend themselves to
easy application of either theory. For one, neighboring home lots may
have fences between the houses, but there is no physical boundary
between lots on the beach.96 Hypothetically, what if the owners of the
neighboring lot are mean and boisterous and like to play frisbee and
baseball on their foreshore right next door? There are also several public
rights-of-way on the beach that extend “perpendicular access” from
Ocean Avenue between house lots down to the water’s edge. Even just a
quick look at satellite photos of the beach belies any notion of privacy or
93. Thompson, supra note 90, at 66 (quoting FREYFOGLE, supra note 89, at 118).
94. See id. at 60-61; see also City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d
73, 77 (Fla. 1974) (“The sandy portion of the beaches are of no use for farming, grazing,
timber production, or residency—the traditional uses of land—but has served as a
thoroughfare and haven for fishermen and bathers, as well as a place of recreation for the
public. The interest and rights of the public to the full use of the beaches should be
protected.”).
95. Author site visit, March 10, 2010, 2:00p.m. – 3:00p.m. [hereinafter Author Site
Visit].
96. Id.
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exclusion in this topographical context.97 To focus in on the beachfront
houses themselves is to realize, too, that, however subjective aesthetic
judgments may be, an annual Fourth-of-July, low-tide barbecue can
certainly be no more a pig in this parlor98 than many of the structures and
pastimes on these heavily-built Ocean Avenue lots. As a result, it is hard
to imagine how the “exclusion” principle of private property could ever
be meaningfully enforced when so many neighbors and so many
members of the public are using the beach in such close proximity—all
fully within their rights even as constrained by the Bell decisions. In
short, does the owner of a heavily-glazed house on a fifty-foot lot right
on a beach that is contiguous to 125 other similar house lots and two
public beaches really have a rightful expectation of privacy, or to exclude
anyone from his fifty-foot strip of sand?
3. Abrupt Takings Analysis
And yet, it is precisely upon this exclusionary right that the Bell II
court focuses its somewhat abrupt takings analysis.99 Having established
for its own purposes a presumptive right of private ownership in the
tideland, the courts likens the infringement of the PTILA to a total
deprivation of the right to exclude, a “permanent invasion” like the one
described in Nollan that, without compensation, made the statute
unconstitutional.100 But, with one eye on the takings clause,101 a closer
examination of the property in question, the extent to which this property

97. See Map of Moody Beach, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com/ (search
“Moody, ME”) [hereinafter GOOGLE MAP]; see also STEPHEN M. DICKSON, BEACH AND
DUNE
GEOLOGY,
MOODY
BEACH,
WELLS,
MAINE,
available
at
www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/pubs/online/dunes/01-439.pdf [hereinafter Dickson I];
STEPHEN M. DICKSON, BEACH AND DUNE GEOLOGY, MOODY BEACH, WELLS, MAINE,
available at www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/pubs/online/dunes/01-440.pdf [hereinafter
Dickson II] (overlaying geological and geographical identifiers onto 1986 aerial photos
of the southern and northern halves of Moody Beach).
98. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“A
nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead
of the barnyard.”). One structure, in particular, a pink, four-story, pseudo-Mediterranean
villa, stands out in both memory and satellite imagery.
99. For extensive discussion of the Bell II court’s takings analysis, see Alison Rieser,
Public Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REV. 5, 12-27 (1990).
100. See supra note 79, identifying Nollan as the “contemporaneous decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court” invoked by the Bell II majority.
101. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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was taken, and the actual compensation due, yields a different
conclusion.
a. False Analogy
First, other than the fact that they both involve beaches, Bell II and
Nollan are not really analogous at all. In Nollan, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the bargained-for right of way for public passage constituted a
taking in the Loretto branch of permanent invasions.102 “Traditionally,”
it explained, “the right to exclude others has been deemed a fundamental
stick in the bundle of property rights.”103 That makes for nice dicta for
the Bell II majority to quote, but that is where its legitimate use in
informing this case should end. For one, Nollan, a case involving an
exaction rather than a legislative taking, was emphatically not a public
trust case. It also involved the dry sand area, open to passage 24 hours a
day, of a beach where the public had no prior right of passage
whatsoever, as opposed to the wet sand area already subject to a public
easement in question here.104
b. Property
Disregarding the misplaced analogy to Nollan, the court still failed to
define with any precision what constitutionally cognizable property was
at issue here. The U.S. Supreme Court has established both temporal and
geographical criteria that need to be evaluated in determining such
property.105 Given the court’s reverent mention of Nollan, a permanent

102. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987).
103. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 367; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (“In short, when the ‘character of
the governmental action’ is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on
the owner.”) (citation omitted).
104. See Nollan 483 U.S. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand the
Court’s opinion in this case to implicate in any way the public-trust doctrine.”).
105. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (establishing that temporary taking may still
require compensation); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (establishing that 32-month moratorium on development
may not necessarily constitute a taking); Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (establishing per se
takings rule where permanent physical occupation); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (establishing that there may not be a taking where
only partial diminution in value of property).
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physical invasion, and one of the fundamental sticks in the bundle of
property rights, it seems reasonable to infer that it had some portion of
the beach, or some portion of the right to exclude, or some combination
of the two, in mind.
But which portion of the beach? The dry sand area was not in
question in this case. Meanwhile, Mr. Bell’s portion of the beach only
extended fifty feet in width. So, it seems likely that the portion in
question would be the wet sand area within the fifty feet of Mr. Bell’s
frontage. Notably, at low tide, this area is certainly larger than any dry
sand area on the beach. That said, there are also temporal bounds on the
area, since, on average, it is only exposed by the tides for approximately
half of each day. As a practical matter, most of the houses on Moody
Beach are seasonal, and most of the visitors to the beach are seasonal,
too, which in Maine, means that the area in question becomes a
controversial one for half a year at most.
And which portion of the right to exclude? The verb is transitive, so
there logically needs to be some object or person that is excluded from
the area in question. Here, too, however, there are more limitations,
because, in all his years of living on the beach, Mr. Bell never had any
unlimited right to exclude. For one, even after the court’s holding, any
member of the public, whether nice or not, retained her rights, “broadly
construed,” to access any tideland lot on the beach for purposes of
“fishing, fowling, or navigation,” or “related activities.” As many have
pointed out, this would mean, in practice, that, so long as she had a
fishing pole or a boat, she could stroll all over the beach, or picnic for
hours. Moreover, as the plaintiffs apparently pledged and both courts
noted in a sotto voce aside, members of the public would still be
permitted to stroll the beach.106
What cognizable property right is left to be taken, then? It would
appear that the only thing left is the right of the owner, if he is present, to
exclude certain people who are not fishing, fowling, navigating, or
engaging in related activities, during half of every day, half of the year in
a fifty-foot-wide lot that is bordered on both sides by more fifty-foot
lots? Taking these limitations together, how could any “invasion” be

106. “[A] citizen of the state may walk along a beach carrying a fishing rod or a gun,
but may not walk along that same beach empty-handed or carrying a surfboard.” Eaton
v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 232, 248-49 (Me. 2000) (Saufley, J., concurring). “As the
dissent [in Bell II] so eloquently summed up, ‘the public’s right even to stroll upon the
intertidal lands hangs by the slender thread of the shoreowners’ consent.’” Id. at 249
(quoting Bell II at 192 (Wathen, J., dissenting)).
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deemed permanent? And even if so, was this much narrower property
interest actually taken by the PTILA?
c. Taken, or A Mistaken Statutory Interpretation
The Bell II majority made three critical missteps in its interpretation
of the PTILA. First, as the dissent noted, it failed in its facial review of a
new statute to accord the legislation its due presumption of
constitutionality. Second, the court seemed to take offense at the
“unlimited” nature of the public recreation described in the statute, when
there are, in fact, four exceptions specified not to constitute permissible
public recreation.107 Those limitations, appearing primarily under the
unambiguous heading “Limitations,” include prohibitions against
interference with existing structures, and on the use of motorized
vehicles or watercraft without explicit authorization.108
The court also failed to take adequate notice of the fact that the
statute also provides for the municipality to further limit permitted uses,
potentially even to an extent the court might have found acceptable.109
Instead, glossing over these considerations, the court next set forth the
requisite “parade of horribles” of all the unconscionable activities the
statute would assertedly permit. These included baseball games and
extended camping, neither of which would actually be possible for more
than a couple hours in the intertidal zone, and both of which the
neighbors on either side of any 50-foot lot could still do.110 With so
many limitations already in place, and the distinct possibility that
municipalities might have, pursuant to the statute, implemented even
more limitations to adequately protect the private interest at stake, it
seems fully possible that the PTILA, if given a chance to go into full
effect, could do so without exercising a taking.

107. Compare Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 176-177 (1989) with ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 73(2) (2011).
108. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 573(2).
109. Id. § 573(3).
110. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177. Because there were, in fact, a number of limitations
described in the statute, one is left to speculate about the unstated rationale of the
decision. As the dissent notes, the enactment of the statute during the pendency of the
Bell II hearings was probably meant to influence the outcome. Did the justices take
umbrage at this as some sort of interference? Would the Bell II result have been different
if the statute had been enacted just a couple years earlier? If the statute had included just
a couple more specific parameters describing allowed uses within the public trust?
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d. Just Compensation
Finally, even assuming there is a constitutionally cognizable property
interest in such a limited right to exclude a few others, and even if it was
taken by the PTILA even before the statute could be implemented, what
compensation is due? Of what monetary worth is that property interest?
Can it really be the $50,000 per lot, as appraised by the town,111 or is this
more akin to a Loretto situation, where the per se private property right
has been upheld, but a token amount of one dollar would suffice in
compensation for the loss of a partial right to exclude some of the public,
from a narrow strip of land, for a fraction of each day during part of each
year?112
4. Summary
In sum, a closer look at the reasoning of the Bell II decision in light
of the actual topography of Moody Beach, reveals that the judicial
cabining of “private” zones of this tideland is a theoretical exercise that
has no meaningful basis in reality. Furthermore, it might be worth
considering that Edward Bell had been a homeowner on Moody Beach
for thirty-five years before ever bringing any complaint. Reportedly, he
and his co-plaintiffs only did so because the Town of Wells had begun to
direct people to the beach in the summer and to station a lifeguard there,
which in turn attracted bigger crowds, some of whom apparently played
baseball and were not so nice. It might also be worth noting that, other
than putting a stop to the lifeguard stands and busloads of tourists, the
Law Court decision may not have had an immediate impact on Moody
Beach itself that would seem to merit all those years and all those legal
fees. After all, the public still accesses the water and walks the beach
and probably still today engages in more than just fishing, fowling, and
navigation in those tidelands. Insofar as a decision of the Law Court
prevails as the law of the state, however, what may matter little for this
one beach may have unforeseen consequences for other beaches
111. In 1989, Wells had ten of the 126 lots appraised to see about purchasing tidelands.
The result was a figure of about $516,000. If a representative figure, then all tidelands on
Moody Beach would cost about $6.5 million. A subsequent revocable license negotiated
by the town and owners was later rejected by voters at a town meeting in 1990. MARINE
LAW INST., CITIZENS’ GUIDES TO OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS
IN MAINE 9 n.7 (2004) [hereinafter MLI GUIDE 2004].
112. ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 168 (2005) (noting that
the final result in Loretto. was that the cable and the regulation remained in place for the
token price of $1 in compensation).
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throughout the state. The specter of this wrongly decided case needs to
be exorcised once and for all so that Maine can join the vast majority of
its fellow states in building a more sustainable relationship between its
citizens and the sea.
III. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE SHORELINE
As anomalous as a doctrine of private rights in the tidelands may
have been two decades ago, the Bell II ruling by the Law Court in Maine
has grown only more distant from legal regimes in other coastal states,
where legislatures and courts have increasingly articulated diminished
private rights, expanded public rights, and a growing deference towards
natural forces at the seashore.
A. Case Study 1: Florida, Beach Renourishment, and Access vs. Contact
1. Factual Background
Starting in 1995 with Hurricane Opal, followed in 1998 by Hurricane
Georges, and then twice more in 2002 and 2004 with Hurricanes Isidore
and Ivan, the beaches in Walton County, Florida were subjected to storm
after large storm.113 One of these beaches, to a large extent wiped out,
would go on to occupy county and state officials, public and private
parties asserting conflicting rights, and court after court for years to
come.
Pursuant to state statute, the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection identified the “problem” of these “damaged” beaches and
placed them on its list of “critically-eroded beaches,” prompting both the
city and county to initiate the process of beach “renourishment.”114 In
response, six private upland owners formed a not-for profit association
called Stop the Beach Renourishment (STBR) to challenge the three-year
permitting and renourishment process in administrative and judicial
forums.115
113. STBR I, 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 2008).
114. Id. “‘In 2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers pumped $156 million [worth] of
sand onto Florida beaches to replace what was washed away by rising sea levels and
more intense storms.’” Forrest J. Bass, Calming the Storm: Public Access to Florida’s
Beaches in the Wake of Hurricane-Related Sand Loss, 38 STETSON L. REV. 541, 570
(2009) (quoting Surfrider Foundation, State of the Beach Report: The Bad and The Rad,
BEACHAPEDIA.ORG, http://www.beachapedia.org/State_of_the_Beach/Bad_and_Rad (last
visited Mar. 7, 2011).
115. See STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1106.
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The Florida Supreme Court, in a strictly limited holding, upheld the
policy of public restoration of even previously private, critically eroded
beaches and the constitutionality of the state’s Beach and Shore
Preservation Act.116 But this supposedly narrow holding, involving a
small group of homeowners protesting a beach already rebuilt, was
nonetheless controversial enough to gain the attention of the U.S.
Supreme Court.117
2. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act
In 1961, the Florida legislature declared “beach erosion [to be] a
serious menace to the economy and general welfare of the people of
[Florida].”118
The legislature further declared it “a necessary
governmental responsibility to properly manage and protect Florida
beaches . . . from erosion,” and to fund beach nourishment projects.119
Based on these determinations, the legislature enacted the Beach and
Shore Preservation Act (BSPA) and delegated to the state’s Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP) the authority to identify “those
beaches which are critically eroded and in need of restoration and
nourishment” and to “authorize appropriations to pay up to 75 percent of
the actual costs for restoring and renourishing a critically eroded
beach.”120 The restoration process in this case, a typical one, involved
extensive surveying to fix both a mean high water line (MHWL) and
erosion control line (ECL) (here, the same line) and to plan the dredging
that would “renourish” the beaches.121
But STBR, consisting of six owners of beachfront property in the
area of the proposed project, had other ideas, and brought a constitutional
challenge to this application of the BSPA.122 Specifically, STBR claimed
116. Id. at 1105.
117. STBR I, 998 So. 2d 1102, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2792, (U.S. June 15, 2009)
(No. 08-1151).
118. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1107 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (LexisNexis 2010)).
119. Id.
120. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1107-08 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 161.101(1) (LexisNexis
2010)).
121. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1107-08. The dredging plan included two options, one of
which was to use a large vacuum and pipeline to pump sand from a submerged shoal to
the area to be renourished. Id. at 1106.
122. Id. at 1106 n.5. The DEP, following administrative hearings, had issued a final
order approving the beach renourishment permit. Id. at 1106-07. The “Joint Coastal
Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands” refers to the state’s status,
under both common law and statute as sovereign titleholder of the submerged bottoms.
Id. at 1106, 1108 n.8; see also FLA. STAT. § 161.181 (LexisNexis 2010). It was this order
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that the section of the BSPA that “fixes the shoreline boundary after the
ECL is recorded, unconstitutionally divests upland owners of all
common law littoral rights [including rights to accretion and reliction] by
severing these rights from the uplands.”123
3. To the State Supreme Court
Finding the constitutional issue raised to be “of great public
importance,” the intermediate court of appeals thus certified the question
of whether the statute here acted in such a way as to deprive the private
landowners of their “riparian” rights without just compensation.124 To
the consternation of the dissent, see infra, the first step of the majority of
the Florida Supreme Court was to rephrase the certified question to read
as a facial challenge: “On its face, does the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral125
rights without just compensation?”126 In choosing to review the statute’s
constitutionality on its face rather than in this application, the court
granted itself the power of de novo review, accorded the statute a
presumption of constitutionality, and raised the burden of the challenge
to one requiring a showing that “no set of circumstances exists under
which the statute would be valid.”127
4. Applying the Doctrines
With
doctrine.
the court
including
trust for

the bar thus set, the court delved into Florida’s public trust
“Under both the Florida Constitution and the common law,”
declared, “the State holds the lands seaward of the MHWL,
the beaches between the mean high and low water lines, in
the public for the purposes of bathing, fishing, and

that STBR challenged in the Florida’s First District Court of Appeals. STBR I, 998 So.
2d at 1107.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1105.
125. Though occasionally used more broadly, or even interchangeably in cases and
statutes, “[t]he term ‘riparian owner’ applies to waterfront owners along a river or stream,
and the term ‘littoral owner’ applies to waterfront owners abutting an ocean, sea, or
lake.” Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd.,
512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987); see also JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
WATERS § 148 at 297 n.1 (3d ed. 1900) (“Littoral is derived from Latin litus, the seashore.”).
126. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1105. The dissent refers to this step as “a manipulation.”
See id. at 1121 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1105, 1116 n.12.
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navigation.”128 “Concisely put,” the court summarized, “the State has a
constitutional duty to protect Florida’s beaches, part of which it holds ‘in
trust for all the people.’”129 On the other hand, the court went on to
acknowledge that private upland owners have their own array of rights
that figure into the question sub judice.130
In Florida, private upland owners hold the same (no more, no less)
bathing, fishing, and navigation rights as the public.131 That said,
“upland owners [also] hold several special or exclusive common law
littoral rights: (1) the right to have access to the water; (2) the right to
reasonably use the water; (3) the right to accretion and reliction; and (4)
the right to the unobstructed view of the water.”132 These littoral rights,
the court recognized, are not subordinate to any public rights and may
not be taken by act or regulation of the state without just compensation;
nor do any of these rights require a separate act of creation, as they are
incidental to littoral ownership.133 The rights to access, use, and
uninterrupted view are considered easements under the law and give no
title to land under navigable waters.134
But the court drew a distinction between these rights and the rights to
accretion and reliction:
The rights to access, use, and view are rights relating to the
present use of the foreshore and water. The same is not true of
the right to accretion and reliction. The right to accretion and
reliction is a contingent, future interest that only becomes a
possessory interest if and when land is added to the upland by
accretion or reliction.135

128. Id. at 1109 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11).
129. Id. at 1110-1111 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11).
130. Id. at 1111. It noted, too, that these common law rights vary state by state. Id. at
1111-12 n.9 (pointing out, as an example, differences between littoral rights in
Mississippi and North Carolina).
131. Id. at 1111.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1111-12 n. 10 (citing Jon W. Bruce, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES
IN LAND § 1.02 (1995)).
134. Id. at 1112.
135. Id. at 1112 (citing Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 227 (Fla. 1919) (“[Littoral]
rights . . . give no title to the land under navigable waters except such as may be lawfully
acquired by accretion, reliction, and other similar rights.”); cf. Restatement of Property §
153 (1936)).
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Inevitably, though, any discussion of these littoral rights requires
some examination of the “dynamic boundary” on the shoreline between
public lands and private lands, and this was the court’s next task.136
5. Balancing Public and Private Interests
Noting that “Florida’s common law ha[d] never fully addressed how
public-sponsored beach restoration affects the interests of the public and
the interests of the upland owners,” the court turned to an analysis of the
statute’s balancing of public and private interests:137
By authorizing the addition of sand to sovereignty lands, the Act
prevents further loss of public beaches, protects existing
structures, and repairs prior damage. In doing so, the Act
promotes the public’s economic, ecological, recreational, and
aesthetic interests in the shoreline. On the other hand, the Act
benefits private upland owners by restoring beach already lost
and by protecting their property from future storm damage and
erosion. Moreover, the Act expressly preserves the upland
owners’ rights to access, use, and view, including the rights of
ingress and egress. The Act also protects the upland owners’
rights to boating, bathing, and fishing. Furthermore, the Act
protects the upland owners’ view by prohibiting the State from
erecting structures on the new beach except those necessary to
prevent erosion.138
Thus, the court concluded, in granting title in any new dry land to the
State without impairing any of the upland owners’ rights to access, use,
or view, the Act does not facially exercise a taking.139
Turning next to the decision of the district court of appeals, the
Florida Supreme Court faulted the lower court for failing to take into
consideration the doctrine of avulsion, which, according to the court’s
reasoning, would recognize the public’s right to reclaim its land lost in
136. See STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1112.
137. Id. at 1114. “Florida’s common law attempts to bring order and certainty to this
dynamic boundary in a manner that reasonably balances the affected parties’ interests.”
Id. at 1112.
138. Id. at 1115 (citations omitted).
139. Id. In case there were any fears that rights would be infringed if the State were
not to uphold its end of the bargain, the court added, “the Act provides for the
cancellation of the ECL if (1) the beach restoration is not commenced within two years;
(2) restoration is halted in excess of a six-month period; or (3) the authorities do not
maintain the restored beach.” Id.
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the avulsive event.140 This effect of the doctrine of avulsion, explained
the court, enables the statute to pass muster under a constitutional
analysis.141 In the court’s eyes, the public, by the State in trust, was
equally an owner that had lost its land due to the avulsive event and was
thereby rightfully reclaiming it by restoring the beach up to the previous
MHWL.142 Because the beachfront had been wiped out in a hurricane,
which is an avulsive event, the doctrine of accretion, the court further
concluded, did not apply to this case.143
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the court held that contact
with the water is not a fundamental littoral right in and of itself but rather
a corollary to the littoral right of access to the water; here, the court
reasoned, any alleged loss of contact was immaterial, because the right
of access has been preserved in its entirety.144
6. Dissent
It was this last bit of reasoning that inflamed the dissent, which
lamented what it called the “tortured logic” of the majority opinion that
“butchered” Florida law.145 “To speak of riparian or littoral rights
unconnected with ownership of the shore,” the dissent asserted, “is to
speak a non sequitur.”146 Interestingly, in an earlier case addressing
related issues, the dissent there had gone on to add, “Hopefully, the
Supreme Court will take jurisdiction and extinguish this rather ingenious
but hopelessly illogical hypothesis.”147 And, indeed, though it had passed
on the opportunity in Belvedere, this time around the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the summer of 2009.148

140. See id. at 1116-17.
141. Id. at 1117.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1118-19. Remember that, where there is gradual and imperceptible accretion
or reliction, the private ownership rights may expand, but where there is sudden change
in the shoreline, the boundary of ownership does not move. See C.J.S., supra note 13, §
94.
144. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1119-20.
145. Id. at 1121-22 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1121 (quoting Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Div. of Admin., Florida Dep’t. of
Transp., 413 So. 2d 847, 851 (Fla. App. Ct. 1982) (Hersey, J., concurring specially)).
147. Id. at 1122 (citing Belvedere, 413 So. 2d at 851 (Hersey, J., specially concurring)).
148. STBR I, 998 So. 2d 1102, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2792, (U.S. June 15, 2009)
(No. 08-1151).
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7. To the U.S. Supreme Court
Given the excitement it caused among private property advocates
and land use planners, STBR’s actual decision came as something of an
anti-climax when it was handed down in June 2010.149 With varying
amounts of obiter banter about proper takings analysis and the
underlying validity or applicability of the judicial takings doctrine, the
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision.150 What is perhaps most remarkable is how little attention was
paid to the provisions of Florida law that would be blasphemy in Maine
or Massachusetts.151 Not even Justice Breyer, a native of the First
Circuit, found Florida’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine worthy
of even a footnote.152 None of the justices found it even remotely
questionable that state law might not recognize a fundamental private
property right to contact with the water, much less possible future
accretions.153 The notion that a state actor might cross private property in
order to rebuild a public beach where a private beach once existed did
not appear to upset the court in the least.154 In short, an even more
expansive version of the sort of public trust rights than the one that
Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court found so repugnant is apparently wholly
unobjectionable in the eyes of the Florida Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court, who found it to be guaranteed by the state constitution,
state statute, and a fair balancing of traditional common law rights.
8. Lessons Learned
Here, then, is a state court that applied a very deferential standard,
perhaps to a fault, to a facial review of a public trust statute. Here, too,
thanks in part to a constitutional and a statutory guarantee, but also to a
strong common law tradition is a very different balancing of the public
and private rights in the shoreline. Here is a vision of the public trust
rights in the shoreline so expansive as to allow the state to rebuild a
formerly private beach lost in a storm, so expansive as to content itself
with the protection of private rights to use, view, and access, without
necessarily guaranteeing contact to upland owners. In this view of public
149. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot. (STBR II), 130
S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
150. Id. at 2613.
151. See generally STBR II, 130 S. Ct. 2592.
152. See id. at 2618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
153. See generally STBR II, 130 S. Ct. 2592.
154. Id.
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trust rights, the court emphasizes the dynamic nature of the shoreline,
and the contingency of any possible interests, and there is virtually no
mention whatsoever of any right to exclude. Finally, here is a Supreme
Court of the United States utterly unfazed by such extensive public rights
and unanimously willing to affirm such an expansive public trust
doctrine.
B. Case Study 2: Trespass by Reliction in the Pacific Northwest
1. Factual Background
While hurricanes were pounding the Gulf Coast of Florida, a much
more surreptitious force was at work in the Pacific Northwest. Thanks to
steady erosive currents, the high tide line off a portion of the Washington
coast was slowly rising, to the point where, in one instance, it subsumed
some previously existing “shore defense structures,” which had been
built, apparently in vain, to limit erosion.155 The anti-erosion measures
had been taken by private homeowners leasing tidelands from the U.S.
government, which held them in trust to the Lummi Nation pursuant to a
treaty signed by President Ulysses S. Grant.156 Claiming that the new
high-water mark157 made the structures trespassory obstacles to
navigation in sovereign submerged lands, the United States sued for their
removal.158 The waterfront homeowners challenged the lower court’s
order for the removal of the structures, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was thus presented with the question
“whether a group of waterfront homeowners are liable for common law
trespass and violations of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899159 . . . because the ambulatory tideland property boundary has come
to intersect shore defense structures the homeowners have erected.”160
Given the dynamic and complex nature of the shoreline environment and
the pertinent legal principles, the court was unsurprised that it would be
“at the boundary between the tidelands and the uplands that the present
dispute finds its locus.”161

155. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2009).
156. Id.
157. As in Florida, the Ninth Circuit measures its tideland boundaries by MHWL as
determined over the course of a 18.6-year period. Id. at 1181.
158. Id. at 1181.
159. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2010).
160. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1180.
161. Id. at 1181.
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2. Conclusions and Dispositive Facts
Among the relevant historic facts behind the complex ownership
arrangement of these tidelands was President Grant’s explicit expansion
in 1873 of the Lummi reservation to include tidelands down to “the low
water mark on the shore.”162 Coupled with the fact that the state of
Washington had specifically disavowed any claim to submerged tribal
lands upon statehood,163 this explicit and long-recognized exercise of
federal jurisdiction persuaded the Ninth Circuit that the otherwise wholly
valid equal-footing doctrine would not supersede federal jurisdiction
over the Lummi tidelands.164
In applying common law principles in this federal context, the court
did not find the common enemy doctrine to be dispositive. At the outset
of its discussion, the court noted how “recurring and difficult” coastal
zone property issues can be given the inherently fluctuating nature of the
shoreline and the delicate balance of federal and state interests in
submerged lands.165 Also important, observed the court, was the balance
between private and public interests:
On the one hand, courts have long recognized that an owner of
riparian or littoral property must accept that the property
boundary is ambulatory, subject to gradual loss or gain
depending on the whims of the sea. On the other hand, the
common law also supports the owner’s right to build structures
upon the land to protect against erosion.166
According to the court, however, the common enemy doctrine was
simply inapposite under the circumstances, because “both the Lummi
and the Homeowners must accept that . . . both the tidelands and the
uplands are subject to diminishment and expansion based on the forces
of the sea.”167
162. Id. at 1180.
163. Id. at 1184.
164. Id. at 1183.
165. Id. at 1186.
166. Id. at 1186-87 (internal citations omitted) (“If a landowner whose lands are
exposed to inroads of the sea[ ] . . . erects sea walls or dams for the protection of his land,
and by so doing causes the tide, the current, or the waves to flow against the land of his
neighbor . . . [he] is not responsible in damages to the latter, as he has done no wrong
having acted in self-defense, and having a right to protect his land.”).
167. Id. at 1188. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit panel also specifically rejected the
notion that the dry uplands might have more value than tidelands. Id. The court
explained:
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Consequently, the court determined that the initial legal status of the
shore defense structures did not foreclose the possibility that the very
same structure might, under changed circumstances, subsequently be
held in violation of the common law of trespass.168 In addition, the court
found that the homeowners’ conscious refusal to comply with an order to
remove the riprap in question satisfied the required elements of intent
and causation in order to find that a trespass had, in fact, occurred.169
Finally, the court took on the state-federal balancing question inherent in
the federal statutory claims brought against the homeowners. Ultimately,
the submerged riprap, which now lay in navigable waters without Corps
approval, was held to be in violation of section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act (RHA), which prohibits the creation of, “any obstruction not
affirmatively authorized by Congress . . . to the navigable capacity of any
of the waters of the United States.”170
Accordingly, the homeowners were ordered to remove their shore
defense structures.171 Spelling out the moral of this controversy, the
court admonished would-be private shorefront builders: “[O]ne who
develops areas below the MHW line does so at his peril.”172 Thus, with
rising seas and eroding shorelines, federal common law principles of
trespass can act in concert with federal statutes to supersede private

the tidelands have played an important role in the Lummi’s traditional
way of life, and in most other areas, the tidelands are held by the state in
trust for the public. These interests are substantial, and the uses they
represent are not obviously less ‘productive.’ (‘[Lands under tide
waters] are of great value to the public for the purposes of commerce,
navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when
permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use and right.’).
Id.
168. Id. at 1183.
169. Id. at 1182-1183. Federal common law generally aligns with the Restatement of
Torts, under which, “a person is liable for trespass ‘if he intentionally . . . causes a thing
[to enter land in the possession of another], . . . [or] fails to remove from the land a thing
which he is under a duty to remove.’ Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158
(2009)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 19
(2009) (“A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a
structure, chattel, or other thing that the actor or a predecessor in legal interest has placed
on the land and failed to remove.”). According to the court, “[i]t is enough that the
Homeowners caused the structures to be erected and that the structures subsequently
rested on the tidelands.” Milner, 583 F.3d at 1191.
170. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 403).
171. Id. at 1191.
172. Id. at 1192 (quoting Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 753 (9th
Cir.1978)).
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property interests in favor of a somewhat expansive federal public trust
doctrine.
C. Case Study 3: Shifting Sands in Hawai’i
1. Factual Background
Unsurprisingly, the issue of changing shorelines is a persistent one in
Hawai’i, too. The most recent case of shifting sands to reach the
appellate level there was filed in May 2005 by beachfront landowners on
O’ahu, who challenged the constitutionality of Act 73.173 Act 73, signed
into law just two years earlier, had redefined accretion, limited existing
claims of private shorefront owners, and asserted state ownership in trust
for the Hawai’ian people over any other future accreted lands that could
not be claimed by private owners.174 Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that
Act 73 exercised an unconstitutional taking of the owners’ present and
future rights to accreted beachfront lands, and damaged their remaining
property by cutting it off from the water.175
The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding
that Act 73 “represented a sudden change in the common law and
effected an uncompensated taking” of both the littoral owners’ accreted
land, and the littoral owners’ right to ownership of future accreted
land.176
2. Hawai’ian Common Law and Custom
The intermediate court of appeals, after mining longstanding
Hawai’ian case law, saw things differently.177 In 1889, the Hawai’i
Supreme Court had held, based on its translations of deed documents
bounding waterfront parcels, that land granted “[a] hiki i kahakai”
(reaching to high water mark), extended to the sea and that the owner’s
rights extended with any accretion.178 The court had concluded in 1968
173. Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawai’i, 222 P.3d 441, 441 (Haw. Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 2009). The full text of Act 73 can be found at 2003 Haw. Sess. Laws at 128.
174. This came only 18 years after Act 221 declared that private oceanfront owners
could not claim any accretions as sufficiently “permanent” to warrant title until the
passage of 20 years. An Act Relating to Accretion, 1985 Haw. Sess. Laws at 401; see
also Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 453-54.
175. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 441-42.
176. Id. at 443.
177. Id.
178. Halstead v. Gay, 7 Haw. 587 (1889); see also Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d 441, 445
(Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009) (quoting Halstead, 7 Haw. at 589-90).
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that the traditional term “make kai,” or “along the sea,” meant that a plot
was ultimately bounded not by a surveyor’s azimuths or calculations of
mean high water but by the high water mark as determined by the natural
vegetation line and the traditional testimony of local, native-born
Hawai’ians known as kamaainas.179 A 1973 decision acknowledged an
extension of property rights to the high water mark, but determined that
the landowners’ rights were subject to such natural forces as erosion,
which might make that high water mark, presumptively the edge of the
vegetation line, move over time.180 Citing the public trust doctrine, the
court held that any land lost to erosion “below the . . . seaward boundary
line . . . belongs to the State of Hawai’i, and the defendants should not be
compensated therefore.”181 The court reaffirmed this holding in 1977,
specifying that the disappearance and reappearance of sands in annual
cycles cannot be considered “permanent” gain or loss, and that “the
specific distances and azimuths given for high water mark in 1951 are
not conclusive, but are merely prima facie descriptions of high water
mark, presumed accurate until proved otherwise.”182
In another 1977 case, the court recalled that, historically, “the people
of Hawai’i are the original owners of all Hawai’ian land” and that a
system of private title did not emerge until King Kamehameha bowed to
the pressure of “foreign” residents.183 Thus, the court reasoned, a lava
extension into the sea vested “when created in the people of Hawai’i,
held in public trust by the government for the benefit, use and enjoyment
of all the people.”184 In reaching this conclusion, the court took note that,
in California, “it is also well settled that being cut off from contact with
the sea is not basis for proper complaint.”185 Acknowledging the
“paucity of land in our island state” and the potential inequitable windfall
to a private owner, the court assured the upland owners that they would

179. In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968); see also Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 446
(quoting Ashford, 440 P.2d at 77).
180. Cnty of Hawai’i. v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973); see also Maunalua Bay,
222 P.3d at 447 (quoting Sotomura, 517 P.2d at 60). This rule was later codified in Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 205A-1 (2001): “[s]horeline” is defined as the “upper reaches of the wash of
the waves, other than storm and seismic waves, at high tide during the season of the year
in which the highest wash of the waves occurs, usually evidenced by the edge of
vegetarian growth, or the upper limit of debris left by the wash of the waves.”
181. Sotomura, 517 P.2d at 62-63.
182. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 774 (Haw. 1977); see also Maunalua Bay, 2009
Haw. App. LEXIS 807, at *22-24.
183. Hawai’i v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 729 (Haw. 1977).
184. Id. at 734-35; see also Maunalua Bay, 2009 Haw. App. LEXIS 807, at *32-33.
185. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 451 (quoting Zimring, 566 P.2d at 729).
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continue to have the same access to the lava extension in question as any
other members of the public.186
In summary, under Hawai’i common law: (1) the “highest reach of
the highest wash of the waves” delineates the boundary between private
oceanfront property and public property for ownership purposes . . . (2)
land added to oceanfront property through avulsive lava extension
belongs to the State; and (3) land added to oceanfront property through
accretion belongs to the oceanfront property owner.187
3. “The Statutory Landscape”
In 1985, just one year before passage of Maine’s PTILA,188 the
Hawai’i Legislature enacted Act 221, which prohibited any “structure,
retaining wall, dredging, grading, or other use which interferes or may
interfere with the future natural course of the beach, including further
accretion or erosion.”189 The legislature’s express purpose was to protect
the public’s access to beaches as well as natural processes of beach
accretion and erosion.190 Act 221 allowed private claims to property
rights only in accretions demonstrated to be sufficiently permanent, that
is, those existing for more than twenty years.191 Then, almost twenty
years later, in 2003, the Hawai’i State Legislature passed Act 73, which
provided that owners of oceanfront lands could no longer claim accreted
lands unless the accretion restored previously eroded land, and that,
henceforth, accreted lands not otherwise awarded shall be considered
“[p]ublic lands” or “state land.”192

186. Id. (quoting Zimring, 566 P.2d at 734-35).
187. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d. at 453.
188. See Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 571-573
(2011).
189. 1985 HAW. SESS. LAWS at 401.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 458. The reviewing Senate Committee found that:
this measure will stop the unlawful taking of public beach land under the guise of
fulfilling a nonexistent littoral right supposedly belonging to shorefront property
owners. The measure will help Hawai’i’s public lands and fragile beaches by
ensuring that coastal property owners do not inappropriately claim newly
deposited lands makai of their property as their own.
Id. (quoting S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1224, in 2003 Senate Journal, at 1546).
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4. Conclusions
Plaintiffs in Maunalua Bay claimed that Act 73 operated to effect an
unconstitutional taking of both their present rights in previously accreted
lands, and their rights to accreted lands in the future.193 The court
disagreed, however, explaining that no taking could be found with
regards to future accretions, because the notion of future accretions was
“purely speculative,” and plaintiffs could thus invoke, at best, merely a
contingent interest in such non-existent property.194 Furthermore,
reasoned the court, “Plaintiffs have no vested right to future accretions
that may never materialize and, therefore, Act 73 did not effectuate a
taking of future accretions without just compensation.”195 Most
importantly, perhaps, the court stressed that, because the state
constitution itself called for all natural resources to be held in trust by the
State for the benefit of the people, private landowners cannot unduly
expect that their interests will prevail over public interests in newly
forming beaches.196

193. Article I, section 20 of the Hawai’i State Constitution states: “Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 20.
194. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 460. “[A] mere expectancy of future benefit, or a
contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does
not constitute a vested right.” 12 C.J. 955. “Rights are vested, in contradiction to being
expectant or contingent . . . when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has
become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. They are
expectant, when they depend upon the continued existence of the present condition of
things until the happening of some future event. They are contingent, when they are only
to come into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed
until some other event may prevent their vesting.” Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 445
(quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 332 (1880)).
195. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 461.
196. It is instructive that article XI, section 1 of the Hawai’i State Constitution, which
was adopted in 1978, twenty-five years before the passage of Act 73, mandates that
[f]or the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawai’i’s natural beauty and all natural
resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall
promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent
with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All
public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.
Id. (quoting HAW. CONST, art. XI, § 1).
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D. Case Study 4: Open Beaches and Rolling Easements on the Gulf
Coast of Texas
1. Factual Background
When Tropical Storm Frances hit the Texas Gulf Coast in 1998 near
the Village of Surfside Beach, it marked a significant change in the
shorefront vegetation line, in the life of Angela Mae Brannan, and in the
state’s shorefront policy.197
Since 1959, and through its revision in 1991, the state’s Open
Beaches Act has provided for the public’s unrestricted access and use
rights in both the foreshore and the dry beaches. These easements
assuring public rights extend from the low water mark up to the
vegetation line, even as it moves inland due to erosion, storm surge, and
sea level rise.198 Such an easement has come to be referred to as a
“rolling easement.”199 The statute further provides for the removal of any
structure “seaward of the landward boundary of the easement.”200
Once Frances had shifted the vegetation line, the commissioner of
the General Land Office duly informed the Attorney General, who
initially informed the homeowners that their homes would not be subject
to removal. However, the Village, also acting pursuant to the statute,
refused permits for septic and water to be restored to the homes.201 When
197. Brannan v. Texas, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799 at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
Undoubtedly, Frances impacted many miles of shoreline and scores of homeowners, but
it had an uncommon, albeit not unprecedented, effect on several residents of Surfside
Beach. See id. at *4. Originally, there were fourteen homeowner complainants, but their
number was reduced to three when another “force of nature” made most of their claims
moot. Id. at *3. Indeed, even during the pendency of the appeal, another one of the
houses in question collapsed during a tidal surge. Id. at *16.
198. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE. ANN. § 61.025 (2010); see generally id. § 61.011(a).
It is declared and affirmed to be the public policy of this state that the public,
individually and collectively, shall have the free and unrestricted right of ingress
and egress to and from the state-owned beaches bordering on the seaward shore of
the Gulf of Mexico, or if the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or
over an area by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of
continuous right in the public, the public shall have the free and unrestricted right
of ingress and egress to the larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to
the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico.
Id. § 61.011(a).
199. See Brannan, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799, at *36-37 (referring both to a “rolling
easement” and the “rolling easement doctrine”).
200. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE. ANN. § 61.025 (2010).
201. Brannan, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799, at *5. Indeed, one commentator recently
argued in these pages for such an approach to shoreline policy, asserting, in accordance
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the homeowners sued both the state and the village for a declaratory
judgment and damages, the state counterclaimed for an order to remove
the houses, as they were “seaward of the landward boundary” of the
easement.202
2. On Appeal
Appealing the resultant judicial order for removal of their homes, the
homeowners asserted four arguments:
(1) that the state had not proven the existence of a public beach
easement,
(2) that, even if such an easement existed, the houses predated
the shift of the vegetation line and did not interfere with the
public’s use,
(3) that the removal of their houses would amount to a
permanent taking of their property, and
(4) that the denial of access to utilities and services was a
regulatory taking.203
But these arguments were unavailing. The court found that the
statute unambiguously recognized a public easement for access to, and
use of, the beaches in question, and that the bounds of that easement
shifted with the vegetation line.204 With regard to the nature of the public
easement, the court found it to have been established by implied
dedication, permitting the public to engage in “typical activities such as
swimming, fishing, sunbathing, playing, relaxing, beach combing, [and]
surfing.”205 The court further observed that “it is undisputed that under
the common law and the Open Beaches Act the easement ‘rolls’ or
moves with the shifting of the line of mean low tide and the line of
vegetation.”206
with the Texas Supreme Court, that the municipal denial or removal of services does not
rise to an unconstitutional taking. See Travis Martay Brennan, Comment, Redefining the
American Coastline: Can the Government Withdraw Basic Services from the Coast and
Avoid Takings Claims? 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 101 (2008) [hereinafter Redefining
Coastline].
202. Brannan, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799, at *5.
203. Id. at *3.
204. Id. at *17, *38.
205. Id. at *23, *34. On the other hand, the days when the beach had served as a public
roadway were over. Id. at *35.
206. Id. at *62-63.
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Following other Texas courts, the panel in Brannan explained that
the ordered removal of a structure under the Open Beaches Act “is not a
taking because the Act does not create an easement, but provides a
method of enforcing an easement acquired by other means.”207 It was,
the court admonished, not an act of government, but an act of nature that
had moved the vegetation line landward.208
IV. SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENTS
A. Climate Change Impacts
It is virtually undisputed that our creation of a global greenhouse has
led to climatological changes that are bound to have an impact on both
private and public property interests on the coast. As the director of
NOAA has unequivocally pronounced: “Climate change is real. It is
here, and it is happening now, in our backyards and around the globe.”209
Drawing on findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
examining the probable impact of these consequences on the Florida
economy, one team of scientists recently found that an unequivocal
global average warming of about 1.0-1.7 degrees Fahrenheit occurred
between 1906 and 2005.210
As a result of the temperature increase, according to the IPCC, the
rate of sea level rise will also increase, which will in turn lead to more
floods, storm surge flooding, shoreline erosion, and extreme precipitation

207. Id. at *64. The court distinguished the claims here from those in Nollan on the
grounds that, unlike here, the California Coastal Commission was trying to establish an
easement that had not previously existed. Id. at *66. Furthermore, the Brannan court
recalled: “There is a difference between a taking and a limitation upon property use based
upon ‘background principles’ of state property law.” Id. at *60 (citing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)).
208. Id. at *67.
209. NOAA OFFICE OF COASTAL RES. MGMT, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A
PLANNING GUIDE FOR STATE COASTAL MANAGERS iii (2010), available at
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/climate/adaptation.html
[hereinafter
OCRM
PLANNING GUIDE].
210. See TATIANA BORISOVA, NORMAN BREUER & ROY CARRIKER, ECONOMIC IMPACTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FLORIDA: ESTIMATES FROM TWO STUDIES 2 (2008) [hereinafter
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS]; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT (Pachauri & Reisinger eds. 2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html [hereinafter IPCC
REPORT].
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events.211 In 1987, even before sea level rise had made it onto the public
radar screen, the average ocean shore along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts
was eroding two and four feet per year, respectively.212 At the extreme,
erosion rates might meet or exceed the “relentless 6-foot-per-year
shoreline retreat rate on South Nags Head, North Carolina.”213 Add to
that a sea level rise of about a foot, and a seven-foot high storm surge
could be expected to occur at least three times as frequently as today.214
On the Atlantic seaboard, warming climate could raise sea level by one
to three feet (or twelve to thirty-six inches) over the next century. In
Florida, “even a one-foot increase has the potential to erode 100 to 200
feet of the state’s beaches, and lead to inundation of the coastal areas.”215
It goes without saying that none of these consequences bodes well
for the status quo of seashore communities, but the projections are still
startling. For instance, “for every 3.3 feet (one meter) of sea level rise,
the economic damages from hurricanes double.”216 Florida’s projected
hurricane damages for 2050 fall between $24 billion and $49 billion,
with between eighteen and thirty-seven deaths.217 Projected losses from
four climate change impacts—tourism reduction, hurricane damages, real
estate losses, and increased costs of electricity generation—may reach
$345 billion by the end of the twenty-first century.218
The projections are not much better in Maine.219 A 2008 study warns
that, while sea level rise is projected at anywhere from ten inches to over
four feet, “[r]ecent analysis of ice data from Greenland suggests sea level
rise could occur very quickly.”220 It predicts the same exacerbation of
211. Id. at 2; see also PETE GRANNIS ET AL., NEW YORK STATE SEA LEVEL RISE TASK
FORCE REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 19 (2010), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/
docs/administration_pdf/slrtffinalrep.pdf [hereinafter NY TASK FORCE] (“With higher
baseline sea levels, the effects of storm surge will be felt further inland. Increased storm
intensity will compound coastal erosion and damage from storm surge. With rising sea
levels, the expected increase in the frequency, intensity, and inland reach of storm surge
events will compound coastal damages and erosion.”).
212. See MARINE BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESPONDING TO CHANGES IN
SEA LEVEL: ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS 50 (1987).
213. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at xi.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2.
216. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, supra note 210, at 5.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 7.
219. See, e.g., Charles S. Colgan & Samuel B. Merrill, The Effects of Climate Change
on Economic Activity in Maine: Coastal York County Case Study 17 MAINE POLICY
REVIEW 2 (2008), available at http://mcspolicycenter.umaine.edu/?q=colganMerrill_
V17N2 [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE IN MAINE].
220. Id.
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storm intensity and frequency, as well as storm surges up to twelve feet
above normal tides.221 In 2006, the Maine Geological Study analyzed the
probable impacts of sea level rise on two topographically similar beaches
in close proximity to Moody Beach.222 The resulting report found that
the “estimated 2 ft rise in sea level will have dramatic impacts along
Maine’s coastlines in terms of sensitive geographic areas including
beaches and dunes, wetlands, and nearshore habitats.”223 In an area that
already sees minor flooding and overwash during storms, predictions
about the potential effects of a storm that coincided with high tide, on top
of higher sea levels, were even more grave.224
B. Demographics
While storm surge and sea level rise pose great risks to the seashore,
it is landward pressures that promise to compound the impacts of these
seaward threats. Soon after the Moody Beach Cases were decided, one
team of coastal geologists remarked that they were less struck by
increases in the rate of sea level rise and erosion than they were by the
“dramatic, rapid population increase in the coastal zone” since the
1950s.225 The narrow fringe comprising 17 percent of the contiguous
U.S. land area is now home to more than half of the nation’s
population.226 Between 1980 and 2003, population in coastal counties
grew by 33 million people, a 28 percent increase.227 As a result of these
demographic shifts, the nation’s beaches are more crowded than ever,
hosting approximately 180 million people for two billion visits annually,
more than twice the number of visits to the country’s national and state
parks combined.228
221. Id.
222. PETER SLOVINSKY & STEPHEN DICKSON, MAINE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY: IMPACTS OF
FUTURE SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE COASTAL FLOODPLAIN (2006), available at
http://www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/explore/marine/sea-level/contents.htm [hereinafter
MGS REPORT].
223. Id. at 1. “Even a 1 ft rise in sea level may have major implications regarding the
future flooding of private property and public infrastructure.” Id. at 6. With a rise in sea
level of two feet, the report continued, “flooding becomes more pronounced and starts to
inhibit emergency access to portions of the island.” Id.
224. Id.
225. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 2.
226. NOAA Facts, supra note 1.
227. Id.
228. JAMES HOUSTON, U.S. ARMY ENGINEER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF BEACHES—A 2002 UPDATE (2002), available at
http://www.netlobby.com/pdf/value_of_beaches2.pdf; see also Ocean Facts on Coastal
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Moreover, whether state courts recognize it or not—and the vast
majority outside of Maine do—more Americans are going to the shore
more often to pursue increasingly varied pastimes.229 “Beaches, resorts,
marinas, harbors and the general lure of the waters bring people to the
coasts in droves to fish, surf, bathe, sunbathe, sail, build, stroll and live
their time-honored ‘pursuit of happiness.’”230 Thus, even as coastlines
are projected to be exposed to increasing risks due to climate change and
sea level rise, “the effect will be exacerbated by increasing humaninduced pressures on coastal areas.”231 Ultimately, though, as many
observers have noted, it is these same humans who will have to realize
the impacts of their behavior and devise successful mitigation and
restoration strategies.232
C. Coastal Engineering
One such strategy, though its success is at the very least arguable,
has called for the implementation of so-called “shoreline stabilization
techniques.” As with many of our common law doctrines, this strategy
can also be traced back to the classical Roman era.233 And it is not hard
to guess why. The coastal area has long been recognized as “a highly
dynamic environment,” plagued by flooding and erosion.234
It was the turn of the nineteenth century, however, that marked the
great age of coastal engineering in the United States.235 A series of
devastating hurricanes in the 1890s prompted settlements like Diamond
Tourism,
NAT’L
OCEANIC
AND
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/facts/tourism.htm (last visited April 28, 2010).
229. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47,
53 (N.J. 1972) (deeming the public trust in the shore “a deeply inherent right” and
recreational uses to be rightfully ever-evolving); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380
(Cal. 1971) (deeming the public uses to which tidelands are subject “sufficiently flexible
to encompass changing public needs”).
230. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at xii.
231. IPCC REPORT, supra note 210, at 26.
232. See, e.g., THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECONS. AND THE ENV’T, HUMAN
LINKS
TO
COASTAL
DISASTERS
12-13
(2002),
available
at
http://heinzhome.heinzctrinfo.net/publications/PDF/Full_report_human_links.pdf (“As
the coasts become increasingly populated, more and more people are placed in harm’s
way. Thus far, science has not found effective ways to reduce most hazards . . . . In the
end, it is human decisions on such matters as land use planning and community priorities
that will build ultimately stronger, safer, and better communities.”).
233. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 70.
234. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 341.
235. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 66.
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City, North Carolina, and Edingsville Beach, South Carolina, to give up
and move.236 But not every community responded quite as malleably.
When, in 1888, the Brighton Beach Hotel on Coney Island, faced the
imminent consequences of an eroding shoreline, it was moved back from
the shore line using steam locomotives.237 And when a 1900 hurricane
struck Galveston Island, Texas, leaving 6,000 people dead, the city’s
response was to build an enormous seawall.238 “It was humans against
the elements, and no one doubted that humans could out-engineer the
forces of nature.”239 The emerging coastal engineering strategies have
usually taken one of two approaches, which have come to be known as
“hard stabilization” and “soft stabilization.”
1. Hard Stabilization
Congress, apparently moved by a similarly tenacious spirit, passed
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1889, which charged the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE, or the Corps) with the maintenance of navigable
waterways.240 The Corps, meanwhile, also began building a variety of
structures meant to counter the effects of shoreline erosion.241 Through
experimentation all over the American coastline, the USACE developed
three basic categories of hard stabilization: “1) shore-parallel structures
on land, such as seawalls [or bulkheads]; 2) shore-parallel structures
offshore, such as breakwaters; 3) shore-perpendicular structures, such as
groins and jetties.”242
But the results of these hard stabilization techniques are actually the
opposite of those desired. As it turns out, beaches in front of seawalls
are consistently narrower than beaches without seawalls.243 The same is
true of breakwaters, which eventually led the city of Palm Beach,
Florida, at great expense, to remove its breakwater in 1995.244 Sea
Bright, New Jersey, stands as another example of just how far awry these
initial hard stabilization approaches could go.245 In Sea Bright, remains
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 66-67.
239. Id. at 66.
240. Id.
241. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 67.
242. Id. at 70. Additional measures to ward off the waves include: revetments, riprap,
filter cloths, sandbags, and gabions. Id. at 72.
243. Id. at 76.
244. See id. at 77.
245. Id. at 68.
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of ancient beach are held in place by long groins but in either direction of
the groins “virtually no beach remains” in front of the mammoth seawall
that towers over the thin strip of buildings it was designed to protect.246
In effect, the beach is “robbed” of its natural and local resupply of sand
by the seawall.247 What’s more, in 1984, a severe nor’easter caused $82
million in damages, essentially equal to all property protected.248 Thus,
although designed with the intent to preserve shorelines, these hard
stabilization techniques shared one fatal flaw in the final analysis:
“directly or indirectly they contributed to the loss of the beach that
fronted the structure. . . .”249
2. Soft Stabilization
Having learned these hard lessons through experience, “coastal
management practices nationwide generally discourage, and often
prohibit through regulatory programs, the use of ‘hard’ erosion control
structures such as seawalls, bulkheads, riprap, groins, and jetties.”250
Undaunted, though, engineers and planners have turned their attention to
alternative methods known as soft stabilization. These include dune
reconstruction and a technique referred to alternately as beach
replenishment, renourishment, or restoration.251 “Artificial nourishment”
has, to a large extent, become “the modern method of maintaining a
healthy beach to help protect buildings as well as provide a recreational
resource.”252
The most obvious benefit of beach “renourishment,” of course, is the
preservation of an otherwise vanishing place for the public to meet the
246. Id. at 68.
247. Id. As a result, important coastal habitats and public access areas are bound to be
lost where shoreline barriers, like sea walls and bulkheads prevent wetlands, beaches, and
other intertidal from migrating inland as sea level rises. Office of Ocean and Coastal
Res. Mgmt., Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Coastal
AND
COASTAL
RESOURCE
MGMT.,
Issues:
Climate
Change,
OCEAN
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/climate.html#climatefour (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)
[hereinafter NOAA Coastal Issues].
248. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 68.
249. Id.
250. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 341.
251. See RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 80.
252. Id. “Beach replenishment involves placing new sand, from some outside source,
on the beach. Reconstructing the beach is usually carried out by dredging, but sometimes
dump trucks are used to bring in sand . . . . Sources of sand are the continental shelf,
inlets and associated tidal deltas, lagoons . . . and inland sand pits. Beach replenishment
is the most important, though not the only, form of soft stabilization.” Id. at 80-81.
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ocean and recreate—and to keep crucial tourist dollars coming into
coastal communities.253 In the three decades between 1965 and 1995,
well over one hundred beaches were replenished on the eastern
seaboard.254 In one notable example, despite the hesitation of many
businesses on the strip, Miami Beach was replenished in 1981 to great
early acclaim, yielding impressive before-and-after photos.255
Nevertheless, beach renourishment comes with its share of costs,
which are often hidden in the “storm-protection” and tourism
preservation pitch to coastal towns.256 First there is the financial cost: $1
million per mile at a bare minimum.257 Indeed, the Miami Beach
restoration cost over $5 million per mile.258 But these significant initial
investments are not the only costs, because replenished beaches only
have a life span between two and nine years.259 In the second half of the
twentieth century and the first three years of the twenty-first century,
even with beach nourishment only just catching on, over $2.4 billion was
spent on USACE shoreline protection projects, and it is estimated that it
will require $3 billion to keep New Jersey beaches replenished over the
next fifty years.260
As it turns out, in addition to the immediate and recurring financial
costs involved, there are also identifiable concerns about the impact of
the dredging, which may either cancel out the effect of the replenishment
by increasing wave action, or cause turbidity, which can kill off fish and
coral.261 Recently, the disappearance of sand from one Connecticut
beach was attributed to “natural causes,” even though dredges had just

253. See Home Page Design and Construction Co., Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric
Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Ocean Facts on Coastal Tourism, INT’L YEAR OF THE
OCEAN, http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/facts/tourism.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2010) (In
the United States, “aquatic and beach activities provide 28.3 million jobs and annually
generate $54 billion in goods and services.” And more tourists visit Miami Beach
annually than the Yellowstone, Grand Canyon, and Yosemite National Parks combined).
254. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 81.
255. Id. at 80.
256. Id. at 81.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 80.
259. Id. at 81.
260. THEODORE M. HILLYER, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS INST. FOR WATER RES., THE
CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND SHORE PROTECTION: HISTORY, PROJECTS, COSTS v-vi (2003),
available at http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/iwrreports/IWR03_NSMS_1.pdf; see
also RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 81.
261. See id. at 17.
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finished mining sand offshore not long before.262 The new beach sand,
moreover, may be too hard for nesting sea turtles.263
All in all, while there is no doubt about fast-rising sea levels and
population levels, there would appear to remain much doubt about the
efficacy of coastal armoring and soft stabilization. Taken together, the
tremendous cost, and ultimate failure, of both hard and soft stabilization
techniques would seem to point to an obvious moral: “Society must
move from engineering against nature to working with nature.”264
Otherwise, as a result of misguided attempts to prevent any change to the
shoreline’s profile, the very beaches we are trying to protect could drown
under the rising sea.265
D. Case Study: Plum Island
For a glimpse of shoreline legal regimes and engineering practices
that are teetering—along with homes—in the face of oceanic realities,
one need look no farther than the very state whose pre-colonial ordinance
and common law tradition of private tideland ownership were heralded
by the Bell decisions. In Newburyport, Massachusetts, a number of
houses on Plum Island have already been lost, and many more, some
“perched precariously over the sand,” remain threatened by the erosive
forces of wind, waves, and tide.266 These privately owned houses have
even been protected by the injection of millions of dollars of public
money into a beach renourishment program, which, at best, promised
only to delay eventual property loss by four or five years.267
Less than two months after the renourishment project was finished,
at least one-tenth, and perhaps up to one-third, of the newly deposited
262. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 3, at 40.
263. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 83.
264. Id. at 70.
265. NOAA Coastal Issues, supra note 247.
266. Mary Jo Shafer, Beach Nourishment Project Gets Under Way, NEWBURYPORT
CURRENT (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.wickedlocal.com/newburyport/features/
x1129162493/Beach-nourishment-project-to-get-underway.
267. Gillian Swart, Beach Nourishment Cost More Than Benefit Says Corps of
Engineers, EXAMINER.COM (July 20, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.examiner.com/northboston-political-buzz-in-boston/beach-nourishment-cost-more-than-benefit-says-corpsof-engineers. According to the chief of the engineering section for the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers’ New England region, the cost of just the beach nourishment part of the
project would amount to $1.8 million and yield a benefit valued at only $1 million insofar
as it might temporarily delay the inevitable loss of property. Id. While the dredging
portion of the project was funded by the federal government, the cost for the nourishment
was to be split between the towns and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id.
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sand was washed away in a storm.268 In January 2011, another house
was ordered demolished before it could become a public safety risk to
beachgoers, and the town began planning for the installation of giant
sandbags as an emergency protective measure for two other locations.269
It seems doubtful that any of these measures, taken at great public
expense, will have even the minimal private benefit sought.
As it turns out, though, this is far from the first time that residents of
Plum Island have been abuzz about the shifting sands under their homes.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been surveying the island’s
protean profile since at least 1827, and it first constructed the jetties at
the heart of today’s controversy in 1883.270 Plum Island in and of itself
became a veritable study in the vicious cycles of erosion and accretion
throughout the twentieth century.271 “Chewed” away by waves and
currents and buffeted by storms, shorelines vanished by reliction or by
avulsion, only to reappear on some other portion of the island that had
been diminished just a decade before.272
And yet, no matter how predictable the pattern on a large scale, the
island residents continue to ignore it, bringing more and more resources
to bear to try and fight the natural cycle.273 Nowhere was this more
evident than in the 1970s, when, according to one observer, things were
at least as bad as they are now.274 The majority of the 13,000 sand bags
filled and stacked in 1972 were swept to sea.275 In 1974, up to $14
million was spent “trying to hold back Mother Nature.”276 The following
year, over thirty concrete blocks weighing more than two tons each were
268. Victor Tine, ‘Concern, but not alarm’: Rebuilt Plum Island Beach Showing Wear
and Tear, THE DAILY NEWS OF NEWBURYPORT (Dec. 5, 2010),
http://www.newburyportnews.com/local/x622288401/Concern-but-not-alarm.
269. See Jim Armstrong, Another Plum Island House Destroyed, CBS BOSTON (Jan.
10, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2011/01/10/another-plum-island-housedestroyed/; Victor Tine, Sandbag Project to Restore Public Plum Island Beach Access,
GLOUCESTER TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011,
http://www.gloucestertimes.com/local/x135632621/Sandbag-project-to-restore-publicPlum-Island-beach-access.
270. John Macone, ‘How many times are we going to save something?’: Beach
Erosion, Regrowth an Endless Pattern, GLOUCESTER TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://www.gloucestertimes.com/local/x845838867/How-many-times-are-we-going-tosave-something-Beach-erosion-regrowth-an-endless-pattern [hereinafter Macone, Endless
Pattern].
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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brought in to protect a single cottage, only to be carried away by waves
that went on to topple the cottage.277
According to the former mayor, “[i]t was the same situation you
have today. It’s like deja-vu . . . . It’s never going to cease.”278 In other
words, “Plum Island, like every sandy shoreline, is a constantly changing
land mass—eroding in some places, growing in others, always at the
mercy of tides, current, and weather.”279
V. PLOTTING A POSITION, CHARTING A NEW COURSE
A. Plotting a Position
As both a practical matter and a matter of policy, the current position
of Maine law with regards to the state’s tidelands is untenable. Some
common law doctrines are crumbling under the stress of evolving
technological developments, as well as climatological and demographic
pressures. Distinctions between accretion and avulsion grow less and
less relevant as human intervention in once natural systems grows in
scale and complexity. Likewise, the notion of uniting against a common
enemy becomes increasingly nonsensical when the common enemy is
ourselves. Similarly, colonial ordinances once relied upon for economic
development are now obsolete. And there is no sign that any of these
pressures will be letting up soon.
Irreversible trends and indicators point to ever-increasing public
demand for habitation and recreation on the coast. Irreversible trends
and indicators, though, also point to an ever-changing, mostly receding,
coastline. The next several years will likely bring more frequent and
intense storms, along with higher tides and storm surges, with both
erosive and avulsive effect. Attempts to armor the coast against such
eventualities have thus far proven counterproductive, and soft
stabilization techniques have thus far proven cost prohibitive and, at best,
only temporarily effective.
As we have seen, though, courts in other states have responded by
ordering the removal of man-made structures that block navigable waters
and alter shoreline erosion and accretion patterns. Whether they do this
under trespass theory and federal statute, as in Washington, under
constitutionally recognized public trust theory, as in Florida and Hawai’i,
or under statutorily recognized, custom-based rolling easements, as in
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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Texas, the judicial panels in these states have consistently honored the
particular public interest in the shoreline over private claims. This
principle was so firmly embedded in Hawai’ian tradition that, even
today, the fluid concept of make kai and the testimony of kamaainas
outweigh any surveyor’s azimuths, and the courts recognize that the
vegetation line reflects the sea’s reach more accurately than any 18.6year average. It is a principle that has been articulated and enforced for
decades even in notoriously libertarian Texas, perhaps because that
state’s Gulf Coast communities have had to learn to adapt to the forces of
the sea more than most. Florida’s court was accused of taking the
premise to an extreme, but the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
declared that the deprivation of contact with sea or possible future
accretions did not represent an unconstitutional taking. At every corner
of the country, and at every level and branch of government, it is
recognized that the state can no longer guarantee, to either private
owners or the public, any more than access to the ever-changing,
dynamic waterfront.
Except, still, in Maine.
The increasing demand and decreasing availability of public beaches
is a nationwide phenomenon, but it may reach its starkest contrast in
Maine. Measuring 3,500 miles, Maine’s coastline is the third longest in
the country, yet only 7 percent of it is in public ownership, and less than
2 percent is publicly-owned sandy beach.280 Traditional shoreline access
points are increasingly built upon, fenced off, posted, or purchased by
new owners unwilling to allow old patterns of usage.281 Regardless of
who owns the property, though, “most waterfront homes are within 100
to 200 feet of the high water mark, and most shores erode 100 to 200 feet
for every foot of sea level rise.”282 Thus, a one-foot rise would force a
whole new dilemma onto private landowners and town or state officials,
for example: the choice between moving the houses at risk, or replacing
the tidelands with a wall.283
Sea Bright, New Jersey chose the wall, but the costs of this decision
have been heavy. It was, moreover, like the Colonial Ordinance, a
choice made in a different era. Today, owners of private tidelands must
obtain an array of necessary local, state, and federal permits prior to any

280. MLI GUIDE 2004, supra note 111, at 2.
281. Id. at 7.
282. See James G. Titus et al., Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and Takings, 15 MD. L.
REV. 1279, 1304 (1998).
283. Id.
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tideland development, and environmental laws prevent most construction
activities in tidelands.284
A careful consideration of the realities of Moody Beach further
reveals the absurdity of trying to draw legal lines in its sands.285 To the
extent that they reinforce such irrational use of the beachfront, the Bell
decisions fly in the face of logic, common sense, and the natural order.
Intentionally or not, their effect goes beyond a mere delineation of rights
in a plot of land to reinforce the hubris of landowners and developers
who insist on tearing up the landscape to erect seawalls and bulkheads
without adequately contemplating the damage done to a fragile limnal
habitat, the real risks of installing themselves so close to a rising sea, or
the long-term private and public costs of maintaining such a precarious
situation. In so doing, the Bell decisions rejected an ancient and timetested common law doctrine and a contemporary exercise of positive law
in favor of an irrefutably outdated pre-colonial one. More importantly,
they combined bad facts with bad theory to make bad law that would
bedevil shoreline zones, and especially the rare beaches, up and down the
coast of Maine for decades.
284. MLI GUIDE 2004, supra note 111, at 8; see also Maine Department of
Environmental Protection’s (MDEP) Coastal Sand Dune Rules, which take rising sea
level (approximately two feet in the next 100 years) into account when issuing permits
for activities within sand dune systems. 06-096 ME. CODE R. § 355 (LexisNexis 2006).
285. Author Site Visit, supra note 95. In front of the beachfront homes, the “swash,” or
seaweed, line lies just a few feet from the foot of the seawalls, which stand, in turn, just
feet from the porches and sliding doors of most of the homes on the beach. Sand piles
up, apparently placed there by higher tides, at the foot of the seawall, which would more
rightly be described as a continuous assemblage of fifty-foot sections of privately
maintained seawalls in various states of renovation or disrepair. Even to the layman’s
eyes, it is clear that these walls take a beating each year and regularly require repairs.
Indeed, one section proudly displayed obviously fresh concrete, and a large back hoe was
in the midst of excavating another lot, digging a deep trench in which to place a number
of enormous boulders in order to protect whatever house would replace the one that had
recently been razed.
All of which goes to show how precariously and presumptuously situated these
oceanfront homes really are, separated from the visible high tide line by only a few feet.
It also shows how the supposedly private Moody Beach is seamlessly connected to the
public beach of the Town of Ogunquit, without any discernible division of any kind.
Finally, one also cannot help but note the extensive salt marsh wetlands on the inland side
of Ocean Avenue. Because wetlands help prevent flooding and shoreline erosion while
providing critical habitat for a myriad of species, they should rightfully occupy an
undisturbed buffer zone where the ocean meets flat shoreline.
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In sum, the current shoreline policy position nationwide, but
especially in Maine, has grown unsustainable in the face of shifting
sands, shifting social priorities, new scientific understandings, and rising
sea levels. To ignore this reality and quibble about who can do what on
the wet sand that already disappears for several hours a day, on a beach
that is likely to disappear in the next century, is akin to rearranging the
proverbial deck furniture on the Titanic.
But this state of affairs need not persist. The Law Court has recently
heard argument in two cases that both raised questions challenging the
Moody Beach decisions; it has decided one without addressing the issue,
but the second decision has not yet come down, and a third case may be
headed to the Law Court soon. Interestingly, the PTILA still remains on
the books, unrepealed by the state’s legislature, and ripe for any needed
amendment. Meanwhile, the Maine Geological Survey and the USACE
are hard at work on a number of studies and projects designed to improve
information gathering and dissemination about Maine’s shoreline, as
well as more adaptive responses to sea level rise.
B. Charting a New Course
In addressing where to go from here, property theorists, scientists,
and policymakers alike seem to be pointing in the same direction.
Legislatures and courts throughout the country are signaling a principled,
strategic retreat from the shoreline, leaving the sea and fragile wetlands
to strike their own tenuous balance with less and less human interference.
This is demonstrably the case in state and federal courts in Washington,
Hawai’i, Florida, Texas, and even in the halls of the U.S. Supreme Court.
It is likewise true in Rhode Island,286 in North Carolina,287 and even in
286. To protect the sediment source of its beaches and preserve natural sand transport,
the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council has all but banned the
installation of revetments, bulkheads, seawalls, groins, breakwaters, jetties, and other
erosion control structures along all barriers and ocean facing coastline. Structures
predating the regulations are allowed to remain, but any structure that is more than 50
percent damaged by a storm or other process must comply with current programmatic
requirements and may not be rebuilt. OCRM PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 209, at 80; see
also Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program (as amended) § 300.7 (June
14, 2000), available at www.crmc.ri.gov/regulations.html.
287. In North Carolina, permanent erosion control structures are prohibited on the
oceanfront since they “may cause significant adverse impacts on the value and enjoyment
of adjacent properties or public access to and use of the ocean beach.” Included in this
ban are bulkheads, seawalls, revetments, jetties, groins, and breakwaters. Such structures
may be permitted only under certain circumstances, such as to protect an erosionthreatened bridge that provides the only existing road access to a substantial population
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Massachusetts, where despite pre-colonial predilections, the courts have
more recently shown little sympathy for ongoing coastal armoring,288 and
the experiences of Plum Island testify to the futility of shoreline
stabilization techniques. Throughout its 2010 coastal management guide,
the national Office of Coastal Resource Management has emphasized the
value of learning from others.289 Maine’s lawmakers, in the state house
and in the judiciary, would do well to heed this call to apply
comprehensive and consistent policies that recognize the new realities
crashing upon the shore.
Even as the Maine legislature and highest court were doing battle
over the foreshore of Moody Beach, a 1985 conference on “America’s
Eroding Shoreline” brought together scientists, engineers, attorneys,
planners, and environmentalists to discuss a national strategy for beach
preservation.290 A theme gaining increasing currency today could be
found among the conference findings and recommendations over two
decades ago: “Sea level is rising and the American shoreline is
retreating. We face economic and environmental realities that leave us
two choices: 1) plan a strategic retreat now, or 2) undertake a vastly
expensive program of armoring the coastline and, as required, retreating
through a series of unpredictable disasters.”291
In one proposed compromise, engineers and managers at the
conference suggested combining the gradual removal and relocation of
buildings, while using an array of damage mitigation options to protect
beachfront property, including abandonment, relocation, soft
stabilization, hard stabilization, modifications of developments and

on a barrier island or to maintain an existing commercial navigation channel of regional
significance. In such cases, the erosion-control structure must not adversely affect
adjacent private properties, coastal resources, or public use of the beach. OCRM
PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 209, at 79.
288. When private landowners on Cape Cod challenged the state’s denial of a permit to
erect shoreline defense structure, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded
that such a denial did not effect an unconstitutional taking, even though the landowners
lost their homes to the ocean while waiting for an administrative hearing. See Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 352 (1992); see also Megan Higgins, Legal and Policy
Impacts of Sea Level Rise to Beaches and Coastal Property, 1 SEAGRANT L. & POL. J. 43,
61 (2008).
289. OCRM PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 209, at 80.
290. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 101.
291. Id. (summarizing the findings of the Skidaway Conference). It seems worth
noting that, at the very moment that Maine’s high court was accusing the state legislature
of a regulatory taking, coastal planning experts were more concerned about how much
shoreline was being taken by the sea.
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infrastructures, zoning, and land-use planning tools like setbacks.292
While the stabilization techniques may offer some comfort, it must be
remembered that these can only provide temporary protection in the short
term. Not far down the road from Moody Beach lies a vivid image at
Camp Ellis of what lies in store for southern Maine beaches that try in
vain to armor themselves against the erosive forces of the sea.293
Moreover, by alienating public interests in the tidelands, private
landowners are likely to meet with much less sympathy and public
support when the inevitable call comes for beach renourishment, seawall
restoration, or, more likely some other adaptation, or relocation aid. In
other words, in order to beat a principled, strategic retreat from the rising
seas, policymakers in all branches of government will also need to beat a
principled, strategic retreat from the Bell II decision.
The fact that advocates of the public trust doctrine did not obtain the
result they sought in Bell II, does not mean the public interest has packed
up and left the seashore. By no means did the court foreclose every
avenue of protecting the public’s own bundle of seaside rights. For one,
though it expressed some reluctance to do so, the court did not expressly
rule out the possibility for a future finding of an easement by custom in
similar cases.294 More promisingly, although a public easement was not
found by either prescription or dedication at Moody Beach, ten years
later, when presented with the opportunity to uphold such a public
easement just down the road from Moody Beach, the court did exactly
that.295
Alternatively, since the Bell court’s objections to the PTILA
revolved around the lack of limitations on public uses and the lack of
compensation to private owners, the legislature could very well amend
the PTILA to include more specific public use restrictions, or some
minimal Loretto-style compensation for the loss of the right to exclude
certain members of the public during certain months of the year during
the few hours each day when the tidal zone is uncovered. Any number
of financing mechanisms might be applied fairly and rationally to
provide for such compensation.
Although the legislature has not yet attempted such a redrafting of
the Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act, it has nevertheless expanded
292. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 69.
293. See Maine Geological Survey, Aerial Photo of Camp Ellis Beach, Saco, Maine,
http://www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/explore/hazards/erosion/campellis.htm (depicting
the lots already lost to erosion and inundation since 1908 and the lots facing a similar fate
as the shoreline advances inland).
294. See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 1989).
295. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 232, 244-47 (Me. 2000).
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public protections to other aspects of the coastal zone.
And
administrative agencies have stayed busy making and enforcing rules
pursuant to these policies. One commentator has advocated a transfer
tax, which would add extra tax on the sale of all shorefront properties in
order to fund the repurchase of public beaches.296 Another has argued, in
line with the rolling easement approach taken in Texas, for public
reclamation of coastal lands through incremental withdrawal of utilities
and services.297 Still others call for the implementation of zoning
techniques—including incentive zoning, bonus zoning, transferrable
development rights (TDRs), exactions, and impact fees—to induce
private owners at the shoreline to convert their property to public
ownership.298
James Titus, who has served for years as the EPA’s sea level rise
expert, has long pushed for coordinated use of all these tools by a variety
of stakeholders in both the private and public realms.299 But his
particular emphasis has been on the implementation of rolling easements
similar to those enshrined in Texas’ Open Beaches Act.300 Rolling
easements, he explains, can be implemented with eminent domain
purchases of options, easements, covenants, or defeasible estates, or, as
in Texas, by statutes that accomplish the same result.301 Titus
acknowledges that no legislation can eliminate the resentment that arises
when two groups have long assumed that they possess rights that are in
fact mutually exclusive. “But,” he persists, “purchasing or legislatively
creating rolling easements can minimize the conflict by laying out the
rules of the game at least a generation before they take effect. As the
article argues, people’s ideas of fairness depend mostly on their
expectations.302 Titus goes on to propose a concerted effort by state,
local, and private bodies, not unlike the effort which their Maine

296. Thompson, supra note 90, at 71.
297. See generally Redefining Coastline, supra note 201.
298. COASTAL STATES ORG, supra note 17, at 368-69. The passage includes a more indepth analysis of takings issues and makes the following recommendations for avoiding
takings claims in legislation and regulation: (1) assure the availability of administrative
remedies; (2) avoid rendering property valueless, and; (3) watch “the denominator” for
conceptual severance purposes. Id.
299. James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to
Save Wetlands and Beaches without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279
(1998).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1329.
302. Id.
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equivalents have all been working on to establish more sustainable
approaches to our natural frontiers with the rising sea.303
It is, unfortunately, the one body that Titus leaves out—the courts—
which have thus far clung in Maine to the now irrelevant rationale of a
300-year-old colonial ordinance, to the great detriment of everyone
concerned. So long as the Maine courts maintain such an outdated and
inflexible policy of private tideland ownership, then both the public and
the private owners will suffer needless consequences. But the fact “[t]hat
generations of trustees have slept on public rights does not foreclose their
successors from awakening.”304 A quarter century after the Moody
Beach Cases, it is high time to set aside the missteps and excesses of the
past on all sides of the issue and find some practical, productive, and
sustainable policy solutions, and the courts must play a role in this
process.305

303. Id. at 1391-94.
304. Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 171 (1991).
305. Indeed, the Law Court will have a chance to correct course towards a more
sustainable shoreline legal regime in one case still pending before it now and another
probably on its way. See McGarvey v. Whittredge, WASHSC-CV-08-42 (Me. Super.
Ct., Wash. Cnty., Jan. 21, 2010); Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, No. RE-09-111
(Me. Super. Ct. York Cnty., filed Oct. 23, 2009).

